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CONFLICTS ON AN UNRULY HORSE:* RECIPROCAL CLAIMS
AND TOLERANCES IN INTERSTATE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
NICHOLAS deBELLEVILLE KATZENBACHt
THE widespread impact of philosophies of positivism coupled with the
growth of legislation regulating previously unrestrained human conduct has
greatly affected both the substance of the common law and the methodology
of the judiciary. Verbal consistency and doctrinal purity have given way to
a process that emphasizes purpose and social function-the "public policy"'
-underlying statutory language or common law principles, a process that
seeks, within the proper limits of judicial discretion, results consistent with
that policy. Decisions which rely on the autonomy of symbols-"mechanical
jurisprudence" to use Dean Pound's famous phrase 2 -are ever rarer.
This philosophical and legislative trend has had a particularly devastating,
albeit salutary, impact upon the conflict of laws. The conceptual castles in
the air so laboriously constructed by Professor Beale and embodied in the
Restatement 3 were based on common law precedent (as fitted into Beale's
theory) and fundamentalist thinking. Much of the precedent has been legis-
latively and judicially modified ;4 the theory of "vested rights" has been brutally
*"[Public policy] is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never
know where it will carry you." Burrough, J., in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252,
130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824). This Article does not, however, confine itself to the public
policy "doctrine." Apologies are probably due to a famous legal equestrian who rode a
different mount. See Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L. REy. 725 (1939).
i Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. "Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom
the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to
be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences
and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last
analysis." HOLMES, THE COM rMON LAW 35-36 (1881). The jurisprudential trend of con-
temporary scholarship has, of course, been to make articulate what has been "unconscious"
and "instinctive."
2. 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT).
The RESTATEMENT does not explicitly adopt the "vested rights" theory associated with the
names of its Reporter (Beale) and Advisor (Goodrich), but it is implicit throughout.
4. The RESTATEMENT is currently being "continued." See AiIERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONTINUED 33 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953) ; id. at 37 (Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, 1954). But not without opposition. See Ehrenzweig, Americai Con-
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murdered by Cook,5 Lorenzen "6 and others, 7 though it still flits ghostlike
through many decisions. We are left, therefore, without a sound and satis-
factory theoretical framework as a basis for solving new problems, and with
much precedent founded, consciously or unconsciously, upon assumptions no
longer valid. 8
Systematic formulations of conflicts theory have consistently abjured ques-
tions of public policy, or ordre public,9 either as outside the proper scope
of conflicts 10 or as exceptions to normal choice of law rules." In fact, much
filets Law in Its Historical Perspective: Should The Restatement Be "Continued"?, 103
U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954). While certain rules will be modified, there is no evidence of
a substantial change in the general approach of the RESTATEMENT.
5. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWs (1942) (a col-
lection of articles, with revisions by the author, which began with the famous title article
appearing in 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924)).
6. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947). See especially
his Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, reprinted from 33 YALE L.J.
736 (1924). The RESTATEMENT was preceded and followed by vigorous debate in the law
reviews between the adherents of "local law" (Cook, Lorenzen) and "vested rights"
(Beale, Goodrich), the latter group capturing, so to speak, the American Law Institute.
But not without a struggle. See, for example, 3 ALI PROCEEDINGS 225, 260 (1925).
7. The literature is vast. See, especially, Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933) ; Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56
YALE L.J. 1155 (1-947) ; Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37
YALE L.J. 468 (1928). For a general discussion see Cheatham, American Theories of the
Conflict of Laws, 58 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1945).
8. Public policy has, for this reason, been increasingly resorted to as a doctrinal
ground for decision. See, e.g., Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 747 (1924). For an excellent general discussion see Nussbaum,
Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Con-flict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940).
9. "Public Policy" and "Ordre Public" overlap but do not equate. For comparative
studies see LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW
(1953), especially c. V; Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25 VA. L. REV. 37
(1938). In part the difficulties are terminological, civil law conceding a wider ambit to the
"personal law," and then cutting it down by application of the ordre public exception.
LLOYD, op. cit. supra at 96. In addition, matters that civil law would classify as ordre
public are at common law within other exceptions to "normal" choice of law rules; for
example: procedural, penal, political and revenue laws. See WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 176-79 (2d ed. 1950) (hereinafter cited as WOLFF).
10. This is the civilian approach, traceable at least to Savigny in its modern formu-
lation. While he does not use the term ordre public, he excludes "statutes of a strictly
positive and absolute (coercive, imperative) nature" and "legal institutions of a foreign
state, of which the existence is not at all recognized in ours, and which, therefore, have no
claim to the protection of our courts." SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-38
(Guthrie transl. 1869) (hereinafter cited as SAVIGNY). Within the first category Savigny
distinguished between rules enacted for the protection of possessors of rights (capacity,
formalities) and those resting on moral grounds or the "public interest." Id. at 35-36.
Savigny's categories have been misleadingly labeled by others as "ordre public interne"
(applicable where promulgated by the state whose rules govern according to private inter-
national law) and "ordre public international" (applicable only where internal rules of
forum apply). WOLFF 168-69.
Anglo-American public policy doctrine is not similarly qualified-at least not explicit-
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of the rationale behind keeping "public" and "private" international law in
separate compartments has been founded on the philosophical assumption
that private rights are unrelated to public policy-an assumption incorporating
the dominant economic and political viewpoint of the last century. Excluded
from private international law were all questions of public law. Courts of
the forum did not enforce the penal, revenue or political 12 laws of other
ly-and therefore has potentially broader scope unless limited domestically by full faith and
credit doctrine. A court cannot intelligently use the substantive provisions of the lex for
as the measure of the limits of what it will recognize; there is an obvious difference be-
tween incompatible local and foreign provisions where both claim to govern the particular
facts, and the mere absence of a similar local provision where the forum has no contact
with the parties and events save as a convenient forum. There is too the danger that out-
moded precedent of the forum will be used by its courts to exclude foreign regulation offen-
sive to nineteenth century liberalism but not necessarily to contemporary economics or
morality. Cf. Kahn-Freund, Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws,
in THE GRoTIus SocIETY, PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 39
(1954).
11. It would seem to make little practical difference whether one calls decisions rest-
ing on the forum's public policy an exception to normal rules or outside the scope of private
international law. A theory of vested rights resting on jurisdictional premises tends to
regard it as an exception because it represents a right not enforceable in the forum. RE-
STATEMENT § 612; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 21 (3d ed. 1949) (hereinafter cited as
GOODRICH). But throughout, the RESTATEMENT leaves room for statutory or common law
modification of the rules it restates, at least within constitutional limits. RESTATEMENT § 5.
Thus public policy may be used in a "positive" sense, i.e., extending the forum's rules be-
yond what would be allocated by conflicts doctrine. See, e.g., Straus & Co. v. Canadian
Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930) ; cf. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting
Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928). Most such extensions have been statutory regu-
lation of local business, e.g., insurance, where state law seeks to protect local residents
from unfair contracts of adhesion. See, generally, CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND
LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1942). For a recent extension of protective policy see Wat-
son v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) and Note, 64 YALE LJ. 940 (1955). If
the forum state seeks to impose a liability not contracted for, or explicitly excluded from the
contract, there are constitutional due process limits. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397 (1930).
12. Since a foreign state cannot sue in its "sovereign" capacity (to enforce its public
laws) the cases invoking these oft-repeated maxims do so in a variety of private law con-
texts. American authority derives from The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825),
where Marshall used the principle ("The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another ... !") to justify a claim of the Spanish government to property in slaves seized
from a Spanish ship by a pirate of uncertain flag. The slave trade was illegal under
United States, but not under Spanish law, and had the slaves been carried by an American
flag, presumably no claim to title would have been recognized. Earlier English cases had
refused to allow a defense to a debt owing an Englishman based on the confiscatory decree
of a country at war with England. Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 123, 126 Eng. Rep. 75 (C.P.
1789), aff'd, Ogden v. Folliott, 3 T.R. 726, 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (K.B. 1790), 4 Bro. P.C.
1.11, 2 Eng. Rep. 75 (H.L. 1792) (attainder and confiscation of loyalist property by
American states in revolt). Cases have also raised the questions whether a contract which
contemplated an act criminal by foreign law was unenforceable in the forum and whether
the "penal" exception could be used to make the contract enforceable. See, e.g., Simeon
v. Bazett, 2 M. & S. 94, 105 Eng. Rep. 317 (K.B. 1813) (ship engaged in smuggling to
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states. Even the "public policy" exception was in effect a refusal to hear a
controversy that departed from local policy embodied in local precedent.
An important element in this hands-off view stemmed from the dominant
legal thinking which foreswore "policy" as inappropriate to the judicial
function. Courts, at least in international cases, were concerned about
"political" involvement where matters of public policy or public law were
concerned.' 3 The problem is, of course, a real one, but one may be skeptical
of such an ostrich-like solution. How far the attempted dichotomy between
"law" and "policy" was carried is perhaps best illustrated by the courts' re-
fusal to recognize the policy of the state whose law was in question, even
though the policy was apparent from that state's disposition of the same
facts.14 Viewing the juridical question as one of renvoi, the Restatement
regards as largely irrelevant' 5 the question whether the state with "legislative
jurisdiction" would apply its own internal law to the same controversy. The
criterion of decision was not regarded as one of self-restraint or deference
Prussia seized, insurer liable despite foreign "illegality"; smuggling abroad in Napoleonic
era encouraged by British government). Compare the modem English attitude as evidenced
by Foster v. Driscoll, [1929] 1 K.B. 470 (C.A. 1928) (contract among English joint ven-
turers to smuggle whiskey into United States held unenforceable as "immoral"), and Ralli
Bros. v. Compania Naviera, [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (C.A.) (Spanish price regulation enforced).
The RESTATIMIENT § 610 overgeneralizes that "no action can be maintained on a right
created by a foreign state as a method of furthering its own governmental interests," but,
except for criminal prosecution, allows the forum to determine whether or not a "particular
claim falls within this section." Cases are collected and policies discussed in Leflar, Extra-
state Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HRV. L. REV. 193 (1932). The
modern domestic trend has been to confine "penal" to its "international sense" (penalties
imposed by state action) as exampled in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892),
though much earlier precedent remains for a broader reading of "penal." Leflar, supra at
205. And the Supreme Court has knocked a good deal, if not all, the force out of the inter-
state "revenue" exception by its decision in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296
U.S. 268 (1935) (sister state tax judgment entitled to full faith and credit). See Daum,
Interstate Comity and Governmental Claims, 33 ILL. L. REv. 249 (1938). Obviously the
penal, revenue and political categories can be subsumed under the more generic public
policy head. See, for example, CHESrnE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1952)
(hereinafter cited as CHESHIRE); NusSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1943) (hereinafter cited as NusSBAUM).
13. NUSSBAUm 115; cf. Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEo. L.J. 483
(1949) (arguing that choice of law rules are a political football in the hands of private
parties).
14. So long as the "laws" of the several nations are simply different refinements of the
same general principles or policies, and the facts are localized, the problem is unlikely to
arise; that is, a court can safely generalize on the basis of domestic policy and doctrine
and formulate a conflicts rule. Savigny attempted this on a broader scale for countries
sharing a Romanic code (though like Story, he identified the principles with civilized (i.e.,
Christian) countries), and Beale for common law precepts. This process-perfectly in-
telligent in itself-creates the illusion of "superlaw" which soon outstrips the assumptions
on which it was built: i.e., similar principles and policies of substantive law.
15. The RESTATEMENT rejects renvoi generally. REsTATEMENT § 7. Title to land
and the validity of a divorce are excepted. Id. § 8.
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among states to policies prescribed by each, but as a strictly legal question
to be resolved by a super-law of reference.
One premise of contemporary positivism (a cloak, to be sure, of many
colors) is that all law rests, in the final analysis, upon public policy-upon
"considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned,"'16 and
conflicts doctrine is no exception. Lorenzen, for example, puts it this way:
"The general problem is, therefore, always the same: What are the demands
of justice in the particular situation; what is the controlling policy ?"1' And
he saw the exceptional status of public policy as it exists in the various con-
flicts theories and decisions as evidence that the rules themselves are based on
faulty premises.'3
Now, "public policy" in the all-inclusive sense of much contemporary usage,
and "public policy" as a narrowly conceived exception to rules which on
principle should apply, are quite different ideas. Yet they are difficult to
segregate.' Judge Burrough's horse has long been an unruly beast, and
there is no evidence that another century has made him less frisky. The ex-
ception, originally dominated by notions of morality, 20 has always had a pro-
pensity to swallow up the rule itself. Sometimes public policy has been a
synonym for provincialism, as in the refusal to apply foreign wrongful death
statutes.21 Sometimes it is merely a round-about device for avoiding the
impact of unhappy full faith and credit precedent, as, for example, when
the California court soberly pronounced the Massachusetts Compensation
act "obnoxious" and then applied its own act, which, except for a more
liberal recovery provision, was very similar.22 In the international cases it
is particularly difficult to saddle, for its reference may be to foreign rules
offensive to domestic notions of morality,23 due process 2 or foreign policy,25
or to the promotion of domestic political or economic interests at the expense
16. HoLmEs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35.
17. Lorenzen, supra note 8, at 748.
18. Id. at 747.
19. See WOLFF 179.
20. The great bulk of substantive applications were in contract, invalidating contracts
against public morals, e.g., contracts that involved committing a crime, gambling, working
on Sunday, restraint of trade or illicit cohabitation or other sexual immorality. See LLOYD,
op. cit. supra note 9; Knight, Public Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. RFv. 207 (1922).
21. E.g., Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 466, 88 Atl. 711, 713 (1913).
22. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504
(1939). The only way of distinguishing Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145
(1932), was to seize on dictum pointing out that the New Hampshire court had not deter-
mined the Vermont compensation statute to be against its public policy. Id. at 161,.
23. E.g., Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880) ; Roth v. Patino, 185 Misc. 235,
56 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 927, 62 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1st Dep't 1946).
The flexibility of contracts conflicts rules often makes it unnecessary to invoke "public policy"
specifically; most cases, including those cited, could be explained by traditional doctrinal
references. In Anglo-American law the public policy concept in its conflicts usage is trace-
able at least to Mr. Justice Wilmot's much quoted hypothetical to the effect that an Eng-
lish court would not permit a suit by a courtesan for the wages of sin even if the contract
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of antagonistic foreign ones. 26 In many instances private and public interna-
tional law-never really far apart-have become inextricably intertwined.
2 7
Current conflicts problems, both domestic and foreign, are reflections of the
increasing and complex interdependency of human activities that know no
state boundaries. Public regulation, legislative and judicial, has affected the
presuppositions of much doctrine. In other respects social and cultural values
have been modified, thereby requiring modification and clarification of conflicts
doctrine. Much of the Restatement, and the precedent which (to a degree)
was valid where made. Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1084, 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 721 (K.B.
1760).
24. The bulk of litigated cases here and abroad involve confiscatory laws and decrees
violative of domestic notions of substantive due process. They could equally well be
characterized as "penal" or "political." Cases involving the Russian revolutionary decrees
and the German anti-Jewish laws are particularly prolific sources. For some of the cases
dealing with the former, see Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N.Y. 71, 193
N.E. 897 (1934); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924);
Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B. 718 (C.A.). On the Nazi laws, see, e.g.,
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947) ; David v. Veitscher
M.A.G., 348 Pa. 335, 35 A.2d 346 (1944); Novello & Co. v. Hinrichsen Edition, Ltd.,
[1951] 1 All E.R. 779 (Ch.).
Doctrine is not confined to seizure of property; foreign judicial procedure may be
equally offensive, though it is perhaps easier to find a lack of "jurisdiction" in the foreign
court. That the due process-public policy exception exists, see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895) ("a full and fair trial abroad . . . under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice . . .") ; DiCEY, CONFLICT or LAws rule 79
(6th ed., Morris 1949) (invalid if contrary to "natural justice"). Public policy is a normal
exception in treaties containing reciprocal enforcement provisions with regard to judgments.
E.g., Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 23 GEo. V, c. 13, extended
by Convention to a number of European and Commonwealth countries.
25. The leading case is Pink v. United States, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (executive agree-
ment precludes contrary state public policy against confiscation; foreign policy becomes
public policy). In genieral, see JAFF, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933) ;
Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on the Application of Private International Law Norms,
51 CoLum. L. REv. 710 (1951). For a discussion of this problem in relation to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund Agreement, compare Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421 (1950), with Meyer, Recognition of Ex-
change Controls After the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867
(1953).
26. Instances would include such diverse examples as the seizure of enemy alien
property, the administration of exchange and export-import controls, and the "extra-terri-
torial" enforcement of the Sherman Act. Compare, e.g., Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft
v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22 (1925), with Braun v. The Custodian, [1944] 3
D.L.R. 412 (Can. Ex. Ct.) (both involving governmental claims to intangibles). A com-
prehensive discussion of alien property problems is contained in 11 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PRoB. 1-199 (1945). See also HOLLANDER, CONFISCATION, ACRESSION, AND FOREIGN-
FUNDS CONTROL IN AmERICAN LAw (1942).
27. For recent observation on the interrelationship of public and private international
law see, McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception,
82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 214-15 (1953) ; cf. Stevenson, Relationship of Private Inter-
natiotal Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 561 (1952).
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it reflects, 28 presupposed a body of law within each state which was largely
the product of custom and agreement, unrelated to conscious policies. Matters
once viewed as of serious public concern-marital relations, for example-
are less intensely felt today. Relationships founded conceptually in freedom
of contract are now vitally related to notions of the public weal. In a sense,
what was regulated status has moved toward unregulated private agreement,
and what was within the area of unrestricted bargain has become regulated
status.
The assignments of "legislative jurisdiction" incorporated into the Restate-
ment are quite useless to a rational solution of many of these problems. Yet
theories of territoriality are deeply rooted in common law precedent and are
only gradually breaking down. What goes on in State X may have a serious
impact in State Y. How far can Y reach out, legislatively and judicially, to
protect its interests as it conceives them? And what is, or should be, the
reaction of the courts of X? What are the limits of power, and what are
the criteria for the respective "public policies" of states involved?
Among the United States these are problems ultimately subject to Consti-
tutional prescriptions. But it is no easy task for the Supreme Court to set
limits without a sensible framework for analysis. To what extent and how
intelligently can due process and full faith and credit be measured in territorial
terms? When conflicting state policies (how measured?) must be balanced,29
is the public policy here involved to be determined by jurisdictional concepts 30
or by the national interest?3 '
28. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contract: Cases versus Restatement,
51 YALE L.J. 893 (1942) ; Lorenzen & Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,
83 U. PA. L. REv. 555 (1935).
29. A contest arising out of conflicting statutes can be determined under the full faith
and credit clause only "by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and
turning the scale of decision according to their weight." Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). Stone's "balance of interest" test is still good
tender, despite doubt in high judicial quarters. Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S.
66, 73 (1954). But see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion querying how "prin-
ciples of equal relevance" are balanced. Id. at 75-76. See further Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 9 (1945), where
the late Justice finds no standards for weighing and opines that the balance of interest test
will not long be the last word.
It is unlikely today that the Supreme Court will permit a state court to refuse effect to
a sister state statute unless the forum also has a substantial interest. See Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951) ; Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public
Policy, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 339 (1952). But given a substantial interest, "a state is not
required to enforce a law obnoxious to its public policy." Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498,
507 (1941).
30. The interrelationship between jurisdiction and the due process and full faith and
credit clauses is complex. In part this complexity is simply the product of history. See
Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cnr. L. Ray. 775 (1955) (re-
lating the constitutional bases to the Law of Nations). In essence, the operative scope of
due process is to protect the individual from arbitrary exercise of state power; it requires,
10931956]
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In international conflicts our public policy has the habit of getting tangled
up with our foreign policy.32 What is the effect to be given foreign legisla-
tion which violates domestic notions of due process ?33 What is the scope of
international full faith and credit-the "Act of State" doctrine-when it lacks
the correlative protection of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should domestic,
political or economic interests be judicially conceived as exceptions to foreign
law public policy, or are these issues wholly for determination by diplomats?
And again, what is the relation of territoriality to acts of state, or of tradi-
tional choice of law principles to explicit mandates of a foreign government?
therefore, some reasonable connection between the individual and the prescription asserted
and some notice that he is subject to the prescription. Traditionally these have been
measured in "territorial" language. The full faith and credit clause, as it has evolved, is
a tool for national regulation of state conflict. To date it has been almost wholly judicially
administered. See Jackson, supra note 29. What could be legislatively accomplished, and
how, is uncertain. Broad implementation possibilities are suggested by Cook, The Powers
of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919). But its
legislative history scarcely supports a heavy legislative hand. See Radin, The Authenticated
Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1944) ; but see 1 CRossxEy,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 550-57 (1953).
While states customarily gave effect to sister state judgments, not every such judgment
was recognized, and the full faith and credit clause was restrictively interpreted as late as
1850 by the Supreme Court. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850). Even
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) could be regarded as restrictive. See Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forumn Conveniens,
65 YALE L.J. 289, 306-08 (1956). But Pennoyer marked the beginning of increased judicial
control by the Court of interstate conflicts, and the test it established-jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with due process criteria-became the measure of mandatory full faith and credit
to judgments. Even local public policy was knocked out as an exception. Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
Due process was essentially a defendant's argument, vested rights to the contrary not-
withstanding. It was difficult to argue that a state was depriving a plaintiff of property
merely because it refused to enforce his claim locally. Yet vested rights was important, for
if it could be said that a foreign judgment gave rise to an obligato within the protection of
full faith and credit, it could equally well be said that a statute, or "public act," did the
same. The commentators thought so, at least. See Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement
of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656 (1918) ; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to
Review State Decisions in The Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REV. 533 (1926)
(an extremely influential article pointing out the procedural advantages of full faith and
credit over due process in regulating choice of law). By the nineteen-thirties the Supreme
Court apparently was following Professor Dodd's lead, invoking full faith and credit more
often than due process to strike down a state choice of law involving a foreign statute.
Due process remained where the forum applied its own law and no foreign statute was in-
volved. One important result has been to move somewhat away from the territorial con-
cepts employed in older due process precedent to the measurement of governmental in-
terests. See note 29 supra.
31. Hughes v. Fetter, 341. U.S. 609, 612 (1951) (the "strong unifying principle . . .
in the Full Faith and Credit Clause"). See Cheatham, A Federal Nation and Conflict of
Laws, 22 Rocky MT. L. REv. 109 (1950).
32. See note 25 supra.
33. See authorities cited note 24 supra.
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Multiple Sovereigns, Multiple Laws and Multiple Rights
Within the world community, methods of policy prescription and applica-
tion are territorially organized within a framework of separate sovereignties.
But the values that states seek to achieve jointly and severally as well as the
means of achievement are not so easily related to geography. Policy is conceived
in functional terms, and the bases of power-persons and wealth-move
across state lines with relative ease.
Much of the difficulty, and fascination, of the conflict of laws stems from
peculiarly difficult conceptual problems. A vocabulary and doctrine geared
to a single legal system are strained beyond their capacity, or utility, when
employed in a context of multiple sovereignties. In common parlance "law"
refers to a body of principles which will be applied by public officials on given
occasions. People may and often do differ as to the ultimate source of these
principles, within reasonably narrow limits as to what they are, and within
somewhat broader limits as to how they may be applied to assumed facts.
We can express this uncertainty by claiming that the law itself is certain
but that people may differ about what it is and how it applies to certain
facts; or we can equally say, with Holmes, that "for legal purposes a right is
only the hypostasis of a prophecy. '34 As a practical matter it makes little
difference as long as we accept the institution and have sufficient confidence
in the hypostasis. Over the great bulk of human relations prediction is accu-
rate, and this leads us to express law as a constant. Actually, in doing so
we telescope the element of time verbally because we think of it as irrelevant.
We use the present tense to describe the predicted future behavior of judges;
and courts, indulging in the same license, use the past tense to describe their
present behavior. In both cases it is the law which attaches consequences to
events, and we speak as though these consequences attach at the time of
occurrence rather than when they are judicially pronounced and admini-
stratively enforced.
What is at worst a mild and not too misleading fiction creates conceptual
problems as soon as we introduce multiple sovereigns. We now have as many
"laws" as there are sovereigns, and, if "rights" are derived from "laws," then
as many rights as well. Semantic difficulties abound, the more so because
similar judicial behavior can be equally well described in language derived from
different premises. When a court applies the rules and principles found in the
statutes or judicial decisions of another sovereign, it can be said that the court
is either enforcing foreign law,3 5 enforcing a right created by foreign law,36
34. HOLxS, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 313 (1920). See also id. at 173 ("The prophe-
cies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law").
35. See STORY, CONFLICt OF LAWS 47 (3d ed. 1846) (the "comity" theory) (herein-
after cited as STORY).
36. DicEY, CoNFLICt OF LAws 11 (6th ed., Morris 1949) ; 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws
64-75 (1935) (hereinafter cited as BELE).
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or enforcing a right created by its own law which is "as nearly homologous as
possible to that arising" under the foreign law.37 All we are doing is using
different symbols to describe similar judicial behavior. Unhappily, however,
the symbols come freighted with a host of philosophical assumptions, supple-
menting the inherent "tyranny of words."
There are conceptual difficulties with any formulation. From the point of
view of the forum, only its law can operate within its territory; that is, be
applied by its judges. The Dicey-Beale verbalization, local enforcement of
rights created by foreign law, avoids this pitfall, but, as Cook and others have
exhaustively demonstrated, it is not an accurate statement of what courts do in
fact: in many cases the right is not one which would be recognized and enforced
by the courts of the state whose laws are said to have "vested" it. Descriptively
more accurate, therefore, is the statement that rights are purely the creation
of the forum's law, but it offends our preconceptions about the stability of legal
relations and our way of talking about law. This statement, rests, of course,
,on the Holmes prophecy theory, and was recently characterized by Yntema-
a little unfairly-as a "truism which contains neither truth nor virtue."38 His
objection is based on its failure as a theory to explain why foreign law (principles
found in the statutes and decisions of another state) is used by the forum as the
measure of adjudication, and its tendency to mislead by exaggerating the creative
role of the forum.
Concepts of territorial sovereignty breed theories of territorial laws--jejune
notions of an "omnipresence" which cannot "brood" more than three miles
from home.39 For Beale and his followers, the territoriality of law explains
why the forum applies its own law and, equally, why it applies foreign law.
It is simply a question of where you get on the merry-go-round and where
you get off; which "sovereign" you are talking about and what you mean
by "law." European thinking has traditionally been oriented from the view-
point of the sovereign whose law ought (in someone's opinion) to govern;
conceptually, therefore, it claims for this law an extra-territorial effect, an
approach consistent with the methodology of codified law.40 The Anglo-
American practice, on the other hand, has always started at the other end of
the spectrum-in terms of courts rather than codes, jurisdiction rather than
37. Guiness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). This quotation from Judge
Hand's opinion is customarily regarded as epitomizing the "local law" theory. See,
e.g., Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 23 YAix L.J. 457,
474-75 (1924) ; cf. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. Rxv. 822 (1950)
(distinguishing Hand's views from those of Cook).
38. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Com.5,. L. 297,
316 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Yntema).
39. "[N]ot only must the law extend over the whole territory subject to it and apply
to every act done there, but only one law can so apply." 1 BEAiX 46.
40. "Extra-territorial" in the sense that it will be honored abroad; i.e., applied by
states other than the one which enacts it, not that it applies to events taking place outside
territorial limits, though it may. See Niboyet, Territoriality and Universal Recognition of
Rules of Conflict of Laws, 65 HARv. L. REv. 582, 585-87 (1952).
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choice of law. Certainly this was the orientation of the common lawyers before
and after Joseph Story. It is, too, the orientation of Dicey, although positivism
via Bentham and a skepticism of judicial innovation moved him away from
broad-gauged "comity" to the more confining concept of "vested rights."
Even more clearly is this true of Beale who, by a curious inversion, gets close
to the continental position despite-almost because of-his rejection of its ideas
of extra-territorial laws.41 Borrowing from Story's maxim that every state has
sovereignty within its own territory and, as a consequence, its laws bind per-
sons, property and acts which take place therein, 42 he re-created territoriality
in terms of "legislative jurisdiction"--the power to create rights entitled to
extra-territorial effect. Law remains territorial; rights are endowed with
extra-territoriality-unless, of course, opposed by the forum's public policy.
We start with the forum's law because of its territoriality, and we end up
with it in the form of an expansible savings clause; from local law to foreign
rights to local policy. Why bother, says Cook; it is really local law, local
rights, local policy. But how questions Yntema, is it "possible to derive from
X what is not X" 43 -to find in the forum's law principles which were not
there before you looked. And, I feel sure, 'Cook would answer with Holmes,
"because the court speaking for the Sovereign damn chose to. . "44
Uniformity as a Policy in Conflict of Laws
If the warp of conflict theory is "sovereignty" then its woof is "universality."
Virtually all commentators today agree that conflicts doctrine has its source
in the positive prescriptions of the forum-that there are as many systems
of conflicts as there are sovereigns to give them birth. 45 Yet there is consider-
able doctrinal agreement among the several laws, and the collective objective
is almost invariably posited as uniformity. The dilemma is not unlike that
of Henry Adams living in the diversity and turmoil of modem civilization
and gazing longingly at a unity symbolized for him by the Virgin of Chartres.
"Justice," it is said, "requires that the decision be the same wherever the
claim is brought" ;46 or results should not vary with the "fortuitous choice"
of a forum.4 7 Hence the effort to create a super-law of reference, to give each
41. The RESTATEMENT has attracted praise on the Continent, particularly among
French scholars who follow Pillet's universalism. Professor Niboyet, in his introduction




44. 2 HOLmEs-PoLLOcK LETTERS 137 (Howe ed. 1944). The quote continues, signifi-
cantly, ".. . however excellent the reasons." Holmes was refei-ring to a criticism by Pillet
of Dicey, and the inference Holmes drew that Pillet believed in a "droit international priv6
which means something more than what the tribunal having to deal with a case will
apply. . . ." For Holmes such an idea was "humbug."
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legal relation a geographical "seat," 48 to pinpoint rights upon a globe-and
thus to reestablish law as a comfortable constant. Theory vacillates from the
heterogeneity of several laws to the unity of a super-law; from pluralism to
monism; from sovereignty to a "general system of international jurispru-
dence," 49 a "world law," 50 a universal recognition of vested rights.
Uniformity as an objective has been more often stated than explained.r'
While there has been much discussion at the theoretical level of devices for
its achievement (for example, the interminable renvoi argument)82 and the
practical and conceptual difficulties involved (for example, characterization
and the need for a super-super-law to resolve conflicts of conflicts doctrine) , 5
there has been surprisingly little critical analysis of it as a policy.
One must, of course, distinguish between the wisdom of using foreign law
as the measure of rights and the need for uniform laws for prescribing whose
law should obtain. Courts and commentators would agree that not all cases
should be adjudicated by purely local rules; that is, in complete disregard
of foreign law. As obvious as this point is, it has been frequently overlooked
or transformed, by a curious sleight of hand, into an argument for uniform
conflicts doctrine. The need for choice of law generally (as opposed to auto-
matic invocation of the forum's purely domestic standards) is not an argument
for any particular law under any particular circumstances, nor for the need
of universal agreement as to what law should apply. And conversely, the
fact that we have failed to achieve universal agreement is not an argument
for the application of local substantive rules.
48. SAVIGNY 27,70, 133.
49. STORY 1042.
50. The reference is to the system of Joseph Jitta, a follower of Savigny, who carries
Savigny's principles to their conclusion in a new tis gentihn. See 3 BEALE 1957.
51. See Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1159 (1947),
observing that it is not apparent why it should be regarded as "intolerable" that rights
may vary with fori. But he then suggests that courts should consider whether or not
uniformity is attainable, and if this seems unlikely, accommodate their decisions to other
policy considerations. Id. at 1161. Where the problem concerns the distribution of an estate
there is, perhaps, a good deal to be said for one administration. The English accomplish
this by a discriminatory use of renvoi. Compare In re Annesley, [1926] 1 Ch. Div. 692,
with In re Ross, [1930] 1 Ch. Div. 377 (1929).
52. The literature is endless and, one is tempted to say, pointless as well. The doctrine
is said to be accepted in some degree by most European countries, rejected by most Ameri-
can jurisdictions. See I RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A ComPARATIVE STUDY 70-83
(1945) (hereinafter cited as RABEL). Most of the literature considers the doctrine as an
abstract device for achieving uniformity. For an intelligent and refreshing appraisal see
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 -ARV. L. Ray. 1165 (1938) ; cf. Briggs, The Jurisdictional-
Choice-of-Law Relationship in Conflicts Rides, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1948).
53. Characterization literature is also formidable. The most exhaustive study is
ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940), reviewed by Cheat-
ham in 55 HARV. L. Ray. 164 (1941), and commented on extensively in Lorenzen, The
Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in The Conflict of Laws, 50
YALE L.J. 743 (1941). For a critical "realist" view see Morse, Characterization: Shadow
or Substance, 49 CoLuaf. L. REV. 1027 (1949).
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Nor is equating uniformity with justice very helpful. If we hypothesize
on any given facts one "just" result, then, as a matter of polar definition,
any other result is "unjust." If we are willing to hypothesize that reason-
able men can differ as to how and by what law a controversy should be de-
termined, then uniformity ceases to be equated with justice and must find
another support. Within one polity it is the daily task of courts to choose
between conflicting claims, each with doctrinal support; that is, to characterize
a group of facts as being within or without one or more legal concepts. In
the sense that one principle must be rejected in its application to the particular
controversy, this process always involves a choice of law. Different courts
applying identical principles to the same facts come to different results. We
may differ as to which result seems preferable, but we seldom do so in the extreme
language of "justice." A few decisions may go beyond the bounds of tolerance,
but more often than not we can accept a measure of difference in result. As
Judge Goodrich, recanting the categorical imperative of vested rights, re-
marked in connection with conflicting choice of law doctrine, "the reference
can be justified by convenience, fairness or what not. But it is hard to defend
as the inevitable and only reasonably possible kind of way to settle the
question. '0 4
Results may, then, vary with the "accident" of jurisdiction. It seems to
me that the statement that they should not is merely an alternative way of
saying that jurisdiction may involve different principles and policies than
choice of law and should not, therefore, of itself change the result. It is not,
of course, because a court has jurisdiction that it comes to a different result
from other potential forums, but because it has different choice of law rules.
Different choice of law rules may lead to different results, but this does not
make any given choice necessarily unreasonable, unfair or unjust.
Obviously what Judge Goodrich, along with others who go much further
in their rejection of absolutes, is saying reflects an attitude, an outlook, a philoso-
phy of law and of the judicial function. Within one polity, or among the several
states, one objective of law is to stabilize human relations, to prescribe for future
contingencies in a manner calculated to effectuate underlying social values.
In determining what these values are and how they are best implemented the
judiciary plays a limited creative role. It exercises its discretion within pre-
scribed limits and in accordance with accepted standards. As to both limits
and standards judges and commentators display within one polity, or more
markedly among the several nations, differences of outlook. The traditional
mythology of both the civil and common law overstates judicial passivity-
the automatic equation of principle and facts. That this process requires the
exercise of discretion is somewhat more readily admitted today than fifty
or one hundred years ago. But only somewhat. Discretion involves choice,
and choice is difficult to square with the objectivity and impartiality that
adjudication requires. The whole structure of law and legal philosophy
54. GOODRICH V.
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argues for certainty and predictability to the maximum extent possible. In
large measure its function is to limit, for political reasons, judicial discretion.
But we go further than that in our thinking. There are constitutional pro-
visions against the impairment of contracts and ex post facto criminal laws,
and a strong presumption against applying any new legislation to events
already past. Whatever their political origin and function, these ideas are
deeply ingrained in our thought.
The theories of vested rights, all arguments for uniformity, really take
their nourishment from this predisposition to regard the law as fixed. We
project domestic concepts and philosophy into international, or multi-law,
situations. It offends our preconceptions about law to state that even the
principles according to which our rights will be adjudicated cannot be known
in advance, and that these principles may vary, even though all the relevant
facts have already occurred, simply because the forum may vary. Absent uni-
form choice of law rules, there can be no certainty, no predictability until we
know the forum.
It would be dangerous to underestimate the appeal of this argument. Cer-
tainty and predictability are old friends. Nobody-least of all a lawyer-
would contend for uncertainty and unpredictability, except, perhaps, as argu-
ments of despair. But certainty and predictability can only be bought at the
price of other objectives. And even in purely domestic affairs, within one
legal system, we can live comfortably with a good deal of doubt at the edges,
in a cold war between doctrinal pairs of opposites,55 without the ordering of
"unruly facts."5 6
To say that, absent uniform conflicts doctrine, certainty and predictability
are impossible because we cannot know the law until we know the forum, is
to exaggerate the difficulty. Actually there is considerable similarity among
the several substantive laws and considerable agreement on many conflicts
principles. As against the extreme of automatic operation of the forum's sub-
stantive rules (to tilt again at windmills), an argument for stability obtained
through the application of foreign law in appropriate cases can be persuasively
made. But, to repeat, this objective does not require that we agree in advance
on the one substantive system which should govern in all possible cases.
Particularly is this true where the foreign legal system is selected on the
basis of an arbitrary territorial connection. The classic example is the sig-
nificance of the "place of contracting"--once related to policy at the time of
55. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 40 (1932) ; CARaozo, THE
PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENcE 4-9 (1928).
56. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949) ; cf. Frank, Civil Law Influences on the
Common Law--Some Reflections on"Comparative"and"Contrastive"Law (to be published,
104 U. PA. L. REv. (1956)). Judge Frank would classify himself as a "left-wing realist"
because unlike the "right-wingers" (Cook, Lorenzen, Llewellyn) he does not stop with ex-
posing doctrinal ambiguities in tilting with the fetish of certainty and predictability, but calls
attention to the difficulties of fact-finding as well, and the impossibility of knowing what
actually occurred, let alone predicting judicial and jury response to evidence.
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medieval fairs and traveling merchants, but since made irrelevant by modern
artifacts.5 7
One cannot argue intelligently for or against uniformity or certainty or
predictability as such. Universality is always an objective so long as it is
universality on the terms of the particular observer. Certainty and predicta-
bility are constant-and unattainable-objectives of all law. But they are
themselves the reflections of other policies which may and do yield to more
pressing demands. To stabilize human relations and to fulfill felt expectations is
a purpose of conflicts as well as internal law. But to imply that uniform
doctrine is necessary to that modicum of certainty and stability at the base of
social and commercial intercourse is to overstate the case.5 8 To attain uni-
formity through universal acceptance of much existing doctrine, based on
ideas of territoriality, would be self-defeating. For if stability of human relations
is an objective, then it may in many instances be easier to achieve through
flexible principles adjusted to particular facts in the light of policy and func-
tion. 9 But the policy and the function cannot be assumed on the basis of
domestic experience alone. The provisions of foreign law are relevant con-
siderations in every case.60
57. Beale's occasional predisposition to dogma was never carried further than his
classic marriage of vested rights to territory in the field of contracts. Beale, What Law
Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. REv. 79 (1909). The "place of contract-
ing" rule was carried over, with minor qualifications, into the RESTATEENT § 332.
58. "International trade could not be carried on as has now become necessary unless
the trader could be assured that he would not be placed absolutely at the mercy of
the vagaries or unknown requirements of the local law, but would find a well-estab-
lished body of law to protect his rights."
1 BEALE 4. But the real difficulty is making a choice between plaintiff and defendant who
have differently understood their obligations. The law merchant, old and new, intelligently
aims at substantive resolution, through uniform legislation or codified custom.
59. Particularly is this approach necessary in the field of contracts where the opera-
tive facts are especially difficult to tie down to geographical borders. Hence the English
doctrine of "proper law," permitting the English judge wide latitude of choice. DicEy,
CoNFrI.Icr OF LAws rules 136-43 (6th ed., Morris 1949). Arguably, New York and other
American jurisdictions have the same doctrine functionally, especially where courts resort
to intent to determine applicable law. See, for example, the discussion by Judge Shientag
in Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1936). See
also Bernhard, A Rationalization of the Illihwis Conflict of Laws Riles Applicable to
Contracts, 40 IuL. L. REv. 165 (1945).
60. The spurious nature of the formal territorial references in vogue as a result of the
RESTATEMENT has been brought out particularly lucidly and convincingly by Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933). Cavers simply
points out that in determining a conflicts case the court always in fact examines foreign law
claimed relevant and the result it would lead to before invoking or rejecting it. Griswold
adds that one important consideration giving dimension to the foreign rule is whether the
foreign court would apply it to the particular facts in controversy, thus introducing renvoi
considerations. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1938). But Griswold
suggests this course not because he believes in the utility of the renvoi doctrine as a device
to achieve uniformity, but because it aids in determining the whys and wherefores of the
foreign "law."
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Story's Comity-A Balance of Policies
Story, together with the great Dutch jurists from whom he derived much,
was aware that a state court invoking state power to settle private disputes is
playing a political role in the world community. He expressed this in his
ideas of "comity"-ideas which, owing to increasing consciousness of the
public stake in private law, have perhaps even more validity today than when
he wrote. No state can ignore the interests or the views of other states as
reflected in their substantive prescriptions without encouraging similar con-
duct, nutatis mutandis, on the part of other sovereigns. From the point of
view of each, the objective is reciprocity-the protection of domestic values,
institutions and policies viewed not simply in terms of the immediate contro-
versy, but within the larger context of divided power as well. In coming to
its decision a court should, therefore, seek to formulate its judgment in accord-
ance with principles which will insure the international integrity of the
particular decision and which, if employed in similar situations by foreign
jurisdictions, will give results in accord with the domestic policy. And it is
equally the task of judicial statesmanship to avoid formulations that, when
applied to recurring fact situations, lead to excessive provincialism from which
the citizens of the world community have nothing to gain.
In this sense, at least, conflicts doctrine is "international law." Principles
must be formulated in terms that argue for universal validity. There should
be no double-standard for the forum and for other states whereby claims
exceed concessions. 61 The principles proposed may be changed from time to
time because of new circumstances or insights; they may be rejected by other
courts in favor of other formulations. To the extent, however, that similar
principles are applied to recurring patterns of events by more than one state,
thus gaining "meaning," a measure of uniformity exists. Accordingly, foreign
precedent is always relevant, whether or not persuasive, in the task of building
up rules of international significance and application. So long as we conceive
of international law as rules binding upon states the violation of which is likely
to induce diplomatic representations, then conflicts doctrine is unlikely, save
in extreme cases, to fit the definition.62 But this distinction is simply one of in-
tensity. Put differently, it amounts to no more than a statement that sovereign
laissez faire tends to prevail as long as the several states can so indulge them-
selves.
61. Where "there is in substance reciprocity, it would be contrary to principle and
inconsistent with comity if the courts of this country were to refuse to recognize a juris-
diction which mutatis inutandis they claim for themselves." Travers v. Holley, [1953] P.
246, 257 (C.A.). The case involved recognition of a foreign ex parte divorce. The word
"reciprocity" is perhaps inept, for as used by the court it means no more than balancing
claims and concessions. The case has been extensively noted.
62. Nussbaum reports no case where the violation of a rule of private international
law has led to sanctions of public international law. NUSSBAuM 25. He concludes there-
fore that conflicts cannot be international law. But quaere. Cf. STORY 13.
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One aspect of, or approach to, conflicts theory, therefore, remains Story's
comity-deference to the laws of another state. From this orientation conflicts
principles, like rules of international law, are rules governing the exercise of
sovereign power, rules of sovereign self-restraint. They have as their objective
the inducement of a reciprocal self-restraint by others. Insofar as they ac-
complish this objective they give the benefits both of a particular determina-
tion and a precedent with international validity, and thus serve as an important
stabilizing force in world affairs. Insofar as they fail, differences will continue
to exist until recurring fact situations or public sensibilities create sufficient
political pressure for consonance through diplomatic resolution.
Now there is nothing in the very general notion of comity from which one
can conjure specific doctrine. One cannot deduce from it, any more than from
sovereignty itself, what the principles of conflict of laws ought to be in any
given case. Story was well aware of this. He wrote:
"It is not comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is
administered, and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same
reasoning, by which all other principles of the municipal law are ascer-
tained and guided.'1 3
The reference to foreign law-conflicts principles-was discoverable in a
general jurisprudence. This was the method of the common law that Story
knew, and he saw no reason to question its validity in an international
context.
At the time Story published his famous treatise, law, particularly in the
United States, was still a creative process in theory as well as practice. Legis-
latures and courts vied with each other in adapting principles of common law
and equity to the problems of a new continent.6 4 John Marshall, with the
help of Story's scholarship, was expounding a strong constitutional philosophy:
the supremacy of living judges reading a living law. Hardening of the judicial
arteries-the conception of law as a static body of rigid rules 6 5-- was a later
development. More conservative than many of his brethren, Story could
nonetheless speak, without blushing, of principles judicially derived from
general jurisprudence-a jurisprudence transcending national boundaries and
local precedent.
In point of fact his comity theory was simple enough, yet flexible and im-
aginative:
"The true foundation on which the administration of international law
must rest, is, that the rules, which are to govern, are those which arise
from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which
would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity
to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return."6
63. STORY 48. (Emphasis added.)
64. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAav. L. REv. 383, 403-04 (1908).
65. McDougal, Book Review, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 376 (1955).
66. SToRy 45.
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Story had no illusions that the task was easy or that the principles or their
application "to the infinite variety of cases, arising from the complicated con-
cerns of human society in modem times ' 67 could be formulated on a priori
theories. As a common lawyer he believed that rules were made in relation
to facts; he queried whether the work of European jurists, despite their
"uncommon skill and acuteness," had resulted in "success at all proportionate
to their labor."68 He was particularly concerned, as had been the Dutch
writers before him whose ideas he found compatible with his own, about claims
for the extraterritorial application of "personal laws" as a "universal obliga-
tion in all other countries." In a passage that today equates with notions of
public policy in many fact contexts, he wrote:
"No nation can be justly required to yield up its own fundamental policy
and institutions, in favor of those of another nation. Much less can any
nation be required to sacrifice its own interests in favor of another; or to
enforce doctrines, which, in a moral, or political view, are incompatible
with its own safety, or happiness, or conscientious regard to justice and
duty." 69
Given a world community in which formal power is distributed among many
separate sovereignties, any conception of law must take account of both the
common and the independent. Story attempted to express this idea in the
word "comity"-a symbol designed to convey something more than the
parochialism of a Podsnap, something less than obligation. On the one hand
he recognizes "mutual interest and utility," the need for law, the inadequacy
of a concept which confined law to power and control based merely on force;
on the other hand he realizes that there exist many decision-makers of equal
status and authority whose views might differ. The most that one could ask
was that the governing rules be formulated by each with consciousness of
interdependence, with knowledge that whatever is said is precedent for like
statements, and with deference to what has already been said by others. Clearly
Story envisioned international law-and he included conflicts-as aimed at
the creation of international precedent-albeit conflicting-which could be
molded, after the fashion of the common law from which he drew inspiration
and experience, into an open-ended corpus juris to which all nations could
look for guidance and to which all nations could contribute insights.70
67. Id. at 35.
68. Id. at 37.
69. Id. at 35.
70. Cf. SAVIGNY 27 ("an international common law of nations having intercourse with
one another"). But "common law" to a common lawyer and to a continental scholar could
not carry quite the same meaning. Story was far more imbued with a natural law outlook
in terms of substantive universals, Savigny with a nationalistic outlook. Story took his
sovereignty at the decisional level, Savigny at the legislative. See Bodenheimer, The Public
Policy Exception in Private International Law: A Reappraisal in the Light of Legal Phi-
losophy, 12 SEINAR 51, 53-57 (1954).
[Vol. 65:10871104
CONFLICTS ON AN UNRULY HORSE
Formalism and Conflicts
Positivism as a Limitation on Judicial Creativity
Treated imaginatively, comity is sufficiently adaptable and alive to the
fundamental role of law in a context of mutual interest and divided power
to be useful even in our infinitely more complex modern society. But un-
happily, despite its auspicious birth with Story, Anglo-American conflicts spent
its formative years in a less tolerant and less sophisticated intellectual en-
vironment. For one thing it continued to get caught up in the theoretical
debates which Story, by training and conviction, had rejected as unproductive.
Worse yet, it was subjected to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
cult of formalism. Judicial creativity, always limited by the demands of im-
partiality, was submerged further in the sterile analytics of Austinian posi-
tivism. Legal scholarship put great emphasis on the judicial function, the role
of precedent, law in its setting of common law principles. Far too little atten-
tion was paid to law in its larger sense of a total decision-making process
and the difficulty of relating (not merely limiting) the use of official (not
merely judicial) power to the achievement of goals consistent with a value
system and a community transnational in many aspects.7 ' Perhaps it was
inevitable that a society which ideologically was committed to a negative role
for government would adopt a positive philosophy of law, better to focus, as
it were, upon limitations on the power of government generally, and judges
in particular. Certain it is that the more complicated and interrelated our
complex society became, the more scholarship avoided the problems raised,
retreating to the false security of precedent, mesmerized, it often seemed, by
law at the level of words.
In jurisprudence, if not in decisions, there was a notable tendency to regard
law as a fixed and static body of principles which only the legislature could
change, and to reduce the art of decision to a spurious science of language.72
Many proclaimed the common law complete, an inventory of principles for
every case. Doctrine with regard to the separation of powers became rigid;73
policy formulation was to be left wholly to the legislature, or occasionally to
the executive, but never to the judiciary. Precedent was regarded as capable
of analytical treatment whereby precise holdings could be discovered. Herme-
neutics became fashionable. Even the legislature--vhich had only words with
which to drive the courts" 74- had its enactments subjected to a science of
71. See McDougal, supra note 65.
72. See, e.g., AusrTi, JtuRsPRuDzNca (1832) ; LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERmE-
xztrrics (3d ed. 1880). That it is spurious because of language limitations, see Williams,
Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REv. 71, 179, 293, 384 (1945).
73. Compare the relaxed view of STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 525
(3d ed. 1858), with Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). There has been consider-
able retreat from the watertight philosophy of Kilbourne, even by such conservative jurists
as Taft. See J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
74. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
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interpretation whereby, it was sometimes proclaimed, the exact meaning of
legislative language could be discovered.
The Impact of Positivism on Conflicts
It is easy to exaggerate the importance of this emphasis upon formal logic,
to confuse form and substance. But it doubtless had some impact upon the
legal process and upon theory about the conflict of laws. On the one hand
it argued for a positive source of law, and hence the origin of conflicts in the
laws of the various sovereigns. On the other, it sought to project passivity
and scientific method into conflicts, a methodology leading directly-almost
inevitably-to vested rights and territoriality. Understandably, neither Dicey
nor Beale was ever able to square the two ideas satisfactorily. Only if one
focuses exclusively on the judicial function--on the mythology of passivity
and certainty (for judges if not for litigants)-on a conception of law as de-
terminate rules changeable only by legislature-can one understand the Re-
statement.
Story's is an approach which could live at the time he wrote and which
could breathe new life when used by thoughtful men. Adjusted to modem
problems and new judicial techniques, it is perfectly valid today. It ran into
difficulty because courts abused it 75 and because it was too free-wheeling for
a philosophy of fully developed common law-a positivism which left little
room for conscious and evolved creativity. Dicey could not accept the view
that foreign law was applied out of courtesy:
"The application of foreign law is not a matter of caprice or option; it
does not arise from the desire of the sovereign ... to show courtesy to
other States. It flows from the impossibility of otherwise determining
whole classes of cases without gross inconvenienece and injustice to
litigants, whether natives or foreigners. '76
Apart from correcting the misunderstanding of his views, and differing with
Dicey as to the scope of the judicial function, Story would have agreed. He,
too, talked of justice, convenience and vested rights.71
To the extent that comity left room for parochialism of the type Dicey
deplored, then the emphasis he gave to the other side of the coin was useful.
The notion of vested rights was and is a buffer against extreme preferences
for local substantive doctrine whose application would destroy reasonable
expectations. Yet even Dicey gave considerable scope to the selective power
75. Illustrative of this abuse are many of the public policy cases. See Goodrich, For-
eign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. Rxv. 26 (1938) ; Nutting, Suggested Limitations
of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REv. 196 (1935).
76. DicEY, CONFLICr OF LAWS 10-11 (3d ed. 1922).
77. STORY 8, 9, 34-35, 40, 45. While he does not use "vested rights" explicitly he
quotes approvingly from Huberus the axiom that "the laws of every people, in force with-
in its own limits, ought to have the same force everywhere, so far as they do not prejudice
the powers or rights of other governments, or of their citizens." Id. at 40.
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of the forum-more, for example, than Holmes thought desirable 78 or Beale's
dogmatic statement would allow. The temptation of a judge to identify local
substantive rules with justice is not easy to override, the more so when one
considers the difficulties of knowing and intelligently using foreign sources.
Hence the need and utility of a strong verbalization-one with constitutional
overtones-to drive him on. Having located law in space to his own satis-
faction, Beale was not about to let it slip across the border.
The Realists' Attack on Doctrine
Enter now the proponents of legal realism--or as Yntema calls them, the
"eclectic positivists"7 9-- archangels of doctrinal destruction. In the conflict of
laws, as elsewhere, they proved with passion that courts were not doing what
they were saying or saying what they were doing. If you want to know the
"law," look at what judges do in fact; pierce the deceptive outer shell of
doctrine to the hard reality of results. Widows, orphans and the tax collector
win; insurance companies lose.80
But still the problem presses. It is helpful to expose the pitfalls of doctrine
and to appraise decisional trends in terms of results. But it is no help to say
that judges select results and manipulate their doctrinal ways to undisclosed
ends formulated by other criteria. One may always approve or disapprove
results by one criterion or another. Result-selection 8 l describes all "law"
in action. The task of courts and commentators is to formulate the "why" of
particular results in terms that, however tentative, can serve as a guide to
the regulation of future controversy.
Existing theory offers some help. Vested rights implies an objective of
protecting reasonable expectations from attrition due to the hazards of differ-
ent or multiple forums. Comity implies a similar objective measured in
public terms: reciprocal self-restraint rather than mutual policy frustration.
One urges the importance of stabilizing private relations, the other sovereign
relations. Both reflect consistent and valid policies.
Thanks to legal realism (admittedly another Joseph's coat) ,82 we have all
become more sophisticated about the nature of the judicial process, more aware
of the importance of clarifying objectives. Rules of law, statutory or judge-
made, have a social purpose and should be construed and applied to particular
78. 2 HOLMEs-PoLLoci: LETTERS 138 (Howe ed. 1941).
79. Yntema 311.
80. Morse, supra note 53, at 1029.
81. Morse, Hoff, and others have given the name "result selective" to the approach
described by Cavers in A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAav. L. REv. 173
(1933). Morse describes it as judicial selection of the principle among competing claims
to legislative jurisdiction which advances the "social or economic interest" preferred by the
adjudicating court. Morse, supra note 53, at 1029; Hoff, Intensity Principle in the Conflict
of Laws, 39 VA. L. REv. 437 (1953).
82. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931).
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facts in the light of their function. To do so judges need become neither
uninhibited legislators nor unfettered glossators. They should simply avoid a
pretension to automation. Abstract principles cannot intelligently, fairly, re-
sponsibly or predictably be applied to concrete facts unless we add the di-
mension of purpose. There will, of course, always be marginal cases where
the decision tends toward being arbitrary. That cannot be avoided wherever
lines must be drawn. But we can insure that the line itself is located intelli-
gently with relation to the thrust and purpose of the doctrine.
The difficulties of conflicts have often been the product of a semantic
confusion derived from the complications in fitting together several laws.
The objective of uniformity and consequent efforts to create a super-law
fitted into traditional philosophies of law and the judicial process. There
are perfectly understandable historical explanations of this phenomenon. One
can sympathize with the serious conceptual problems of early writers trying,
in an age that emphasized sovereignty, to justify and explain why the forum
applied foreign law.
I do not understand the position of Cook and his followers to have been
one of eclecticism. It is true that Cook may have overemphasized the creative
capacity of the forum in his eagerness to prove the fallacies of then current
theories of legislative jurisdiction. And it is true that his critique could be
naively read to assert the omnipotence of the forum's judges-forgetting that
there are other forums and other cases to come, ignoring the long term interest
and the wisdom of self-restraint. But I take it that his "eclecticism" consists
only of his refusal to accept popular dogma and -his failure to substitute more
valid criteria-the latter a task that he concededly left mostly to others.
Law as an Instrument of Public Policy
The realists concentrated their attention-like their philosophical prede-
cessors and adversaries-on the judicial function; they exposed the tautologies
of legal logic and attacked existing theory at the level of description. At the
same time, increasing industrialism, with its specialization, interdependence,
and concentration of power and wealth through organization, has made the
public more aware of its stake in hitherto "private" activities. As legislatures
have ground out new statutes aimed at new problems we have inevitably ar-
rived at a view which contemplates an active role for government, and hence
for law. In fact and in theory we have come to regard law as a creative instru-
ment for using public power to fulfill community expectations with regard to
all values, and not merely the preservation of order.8 3 The "policeman" of
83. McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception,
82 RFcuEm DES CouRs 137, 169-70 (1953) ; see also McDougal, The Comparative Study
of Law for Policy PFurposes: Value Clarification as an Instrionent of Denwcratic World
Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915, 931-32 (1952). The reader familiar with Professor McDougal's
writing does not need to be told how much the analysis here presented is derived from his
conception and philosophy of law.
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classic liberalism has evolved into the "social engineer" of the welfare state.
Law is not, and can no longer be intelligently conceived as, merely a bundle
of directionless rules-the conception which dominated the age of formalism
but which, even with the safety valve of legislative change, was overstated
in fact. And particularly is this true with regard to law in the international
community, where there is no safety valve, where political processes and
institutions are less highly developed, and where a formal basis for law, apart
from treaty or agreement and the process here described, simply does not exist.
I do not mean to suggest that the judicial function has been radically altered,
or that the discretion of judges to formulate the public policy is not a limited
one. But the methodology and approach of judges has greatly changed. Per-
haps the most obvious example is in the interpretation of statutes where pur-
pose and policy, as gleaned from a variety of sources, dominates literalism in
its application to facts. We have not, perhaps, quite reached the point where
courts feel free to derive a policy from the explicit coverage of a statute and
apply that policy to analogous cases,84 but we are not so far off. Conscious
reappraisal of older doctrine in the light of social and legislative change and
community objectives is, if not yet commonplace, ever more frequent.
Because conflicts has been a favorite outlet for philosophers it has been
infused with domestic conceptions of law and the judicial function which have
greatly confused and obscured underlying problems and policies. Interna-
tional law, including conflicts, is like all law simply a process of decision 85
in which many authoritative decision-makers, including judges, respond in
various ways to events, claims and counterclaims. It is the task of all these
decision-makers within the limits of their domestic authority, to seek to
synthesize the flow of decisions in terms of new doctrine, oriented to new
problems-to discover and to formulate, as Story puf it, principles of "general
jurisprudence" to govern "multi-law" events.
Conflicts and the International "Constitution"
What we commonly refer to as "law" is, then, the sum total of consider-
ations, drawn from a variety of sources-statutes, prior judicial or administra-
tive rules or practices, custom, prevailing ethical and moral beliefs, and so forth
-which both limit and guide the exercise of governmental power by desig-
nated officials. It has as its objective the realization of community expecta-
tions with regard to many values. Any meaningful concept must assume that
power is so exercised,"6 else the distinction between "law" and power based
on mere force is obliterated.
Within one polity sovereign power is distributed among various public
officials who act in prescribed ways to effectuate generally prescribed or
84. See Pound, supra note 64, at 385-86.
85. The process is described at some length in McDougal, International Law, Power
and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 REcUEIL DES CouRs 137, 180-88 (1953).
86. Id. at 183.
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assumed value changes. Fundamental distributions of, and limitations upon,
the exercise of public power are often designated "constitutional." Institutions
for the resolution of differences, the formulation of objectives, and the admini-
stration of policies are highly developed. The behavior of public officials,
especially those concerned with administration, is in general predictable
because we can know in advance the considerations that officials will weigh
and the criteria they will employ in making their decisions.
Within the world community political processes are less highly developed
and political institutions are in the formative stages. We are still in the process
of attempting to formulate the principles of an unwritten "constitution." The
fact that formal power is distributed geographically, rather than functionally,
makes necessary mutual assistance and reciprocal self-restraint in its exercise.
Wherever interdependency exists there is pressure for consonance. Resolution
may be in terms of substantive policy itself, or it may be in terms of allocating
competence, within substantive limits, to prescribe that policy. What we are
wont to refer to as "international law" are those fundamental distributions of,
and limitations upon, the power of the various sovereigns which roughly cor-
respond to typical provisions of domestic constitutions. The conflict of laws
operates within these constitutional principles, at a lower level of intensity.
Prediction in the international community is somewhat more hazardous than
in the domestic one until the decision-maker is identified. Each sovereign is,
presumably, using its power to effectuate its policies in the international
community. To the extent those policies differ, or are differently prescribed,
the forum must be ascertained before prediction can be brought within do-
mestic standards of accuracy.
The general predisposition of sovereigns to be cautious in promulgating
"constitutional" limitations which may later operate upon their own sover-
eignty, combined with absence of an institution for definitively resolving differ-
ences, has left to all a wide area of discretion to act without protest or reprisal.
Formalistic positivism, when it did not deny totally the existence of inter-
national law, distorted intelligent restraint into a definition of international
law as rules governing the relationships of sovereigns. A typical product of
nineteenth century thought,sr this view of international law overemphasizes
limitations upon power and even here fails to relate limitations to intelligent
substantive policies. To fit the definition it confuses substance and procedure,
for even as traditionally formulated, much of the doctrine is concerned with
the protection of individual, not sovereign, rights.
I do not wish to revive the debates of the last century as to whether or not
conflicts is international law. That is a matter of definition. I prefer to con-
ceive all authoritative decisions which affect the international community as
international "law," and the various decision-makers as participants in the
process of creating valid principles grounded, like domestic law, on expressed
87. McDougal and Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitu-
tional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60, 82-83 (1949).
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policies. Those principles and policies that are considered fundamental I
would label "constitutional," the better to draw a domestic parallel. "Due
process," substantive and procedural, has its international equivalent in that
loose collection of fundamental notions of decency or natural justice the viola-
tion of which is claimed to be a "denial of justice." The provisions of Article
IV of our Federal Constitution which are aimed at the protection of the
interests of sister states are similarly present in the international constitution.
What we domestically refer to as "full faith and credit" passes internationally
as "acts of state." There are differences, of course. The greater interdepend-
ency of the states, the national interest of consonance, the similar policies and
doctrine of the several laws combine with the existence of an authoritative
political institution to produce precise domestic prescriptions and to refine
constitutional mandates.
Therefore, it seems to me that the argument as to whether or not conflicts
is international law is very much like the argument as to whether or not,
domestically, all conflicts questions are ones of constitutional law.88 The
only intelligent answer is a descriptive one. Given sufficient intensity and
sufficient pressure for consonance a question will be claimed to have that
fundamental importance we reserve for constitutional issues. The difference
is one of degree and not of kind.
SOME HISTORICAL P-ERSPECTIVES
The Universal Law
During the early and formative period of conflicts doctrine 89 both civil
and common law jurisprudence were heavily imbued with the spirit of a
jus gentium. On the continent the jus gentium was identified with principles
of Roman law, which in turn were proclaimed the law of civilized people
everywhere. Conflicts problems grew up on margins of common doctrine and
partook of similar universalism. The first experience was with local ordinances
sufficiently similar in content to urge similar classification-the medieval
"statutes" 0 which supplemented the broader fundamentals of the common
Roman heritage. Later, in the same vein, came codified local customs. Absent
such written documentation a civil court would -have drawn upon less formal
sources to reduce principle to case. Given a local enactment the problem was
approached as one of interpretation-to what events, persons and property
88. I can conceive no question that could not be picked up by the elastic provisions of
full faith and credit. See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1945).
89. On the history of the conflict of laws see, generally, 3 BEaLE 1880; WOLFF 19;
Yntcma.
90. The most famous commentary is that of Bartolus (1313-1357). See BEALE,
BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS (1914). The statutory interpretation technique
dominated conflicts for some five centuries, in the course of which a highly developed com-
plex of semantic analysis was built up.
1956] 1111
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
did it apply? Scholars, working with similar local provisions within a com-
mon framework, sought to work out a common mode of interpretation as well.
Because it aspired to universality in substantive terms, Roman law did not
deal explicitly with choice of law. But the substantive provisions were suffici-
ently general and the gaps sufficiently broad, as Savigny brilliantly demon-
strated, to take account of local custom. One could even argue, as indeed
Savigny did, that a conflicts system was inherent within and could be derived
from the general principles of Roman law and that these principles were in
fact to be found in the law of all civilized nations. Thus, even after the
impact of nationalism and the growth of national polities, with their doctrinal
superstructure of territorial sovereignty, the earlier vision of universality did
not die easily.91 Nor should it necessarily. There was and still is much in
common among nations in terms of the policy and rationale of particular
rules, and much that can be derived therefrom for choice of law purposes.
The intestate distribution of personal property, for example, differs among
jurisdictions as to proportions awarded to various individuals, but all rules
revolve around a common conception of familial distribution; a fact that argues
-so long as this policy is common-for a law with which the decedent was
closely associated. Ease of unitary administration, the interest of the state
in the provision for dependents and a more or less fictional "intent" point
to the personal law, although in an age of mobility further refinements may
be necessary in identifying this law. 92
Though the methodology of Anglo-American law, without a complete in-
ventory of written principles, was different, it too had its jus gentium flavor.
But the historical development of English law, with its unique court structure,
gave the whole a procedural twist. The nature of the cause of action-the writ
which would lie-dominated the internal division of administrative responsi-
bilities and the relief which courts were locally empowered to give. Thus,
from the outset, jurisdiction and the substantive law got intertwined and
oriented inwardly to the quite irrelevant (for conflicts purposes) practice and
pleading that characterized the legal system. Remedies remained, in important
respects, matters of local law because, at the very least, the kind of relief that
could be granted was a function of the court that heard the dispute. It would
scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the emphasis given to pleading made it
virtually impossible to start with anything save an English cause of action,
or to put it differently, one which was sufficiently akin to a familiar cause to
91. See, generally, Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in
the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUm. L. REv. 189 (1942).
92. The controversy is generally between a conception of domicil and nationality as
governing the "personal" law. But even domicil can, within the same or similar definitions,
be difficult to determine on mobile facts. For general comparative discussions see CHEsHIrE
150-95; RABEL c. 4.
One of Cook's major points of issue with the Restaters was the unitary concept of
domicil adopted by the ALl. Coox, THE LoGIcAI. AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLiCr OF
LAws 194-99 (1942). He suggests that the approach be made more flexible and adapted
to the particular facts and particular laws.
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make it pleadable within known forms. Foreign law was almost invariably
a matter of defense-the injustice of applying local rules derived from local
facts to the case at hand.9 3
Had a different view of law prevailed during the eighteenth and early nine-
;teenth centuries perhaps these internal administrative arrangements would
have taken a less jugular hold on Anglo-American conflicts. But the rules
which courts applied in private disputes were not in conception the edicts of
a particular sovereign until reduced to judgment. A jus gentium jurispru-
dence, often based on natural law, envisioned rights as derived from customary
norms of conduct and universal concepts of morality, and the law itself a
process of discovery rather than fiat. Therefore, the way a foreign court
might treat the same or similar controversies had no particularly persuasive
force. It did not preclude the relevancy of provisions of foreign positive
law, but the applicability of particular rules to interstate facts was to be worked
out, as with the civilians, within the larger framework of substantive universals.
For the English judge or chancellor foreign law was simply a fact to be
proved, weighed and assessed against, in Story's phrase, "principles of general
jurisprudence." To repeat the same example, if personal property located
in England was distributed according to the law of the domicil it was not
because that sovereign claimed competency or because English positive law
insisted upon it, but simply because an English chancellor believed this was
the proper way to distribute it. His belief was based on the assumptions that
disposal of such property should be in accordance with the probable intent
of the intestate, and, in the absence of explicit provision by will, that his intent
was most probably in accordance with those rules with which he was most
familiar. And the court's power thus to "discover" and pronounce what it
viewed as the jus gentium-that personal property shall be disposed of in ac-
cordance with the intent of the intestate-gained comfortable support from
theories of sovereignty upon which English judges generally, and Story in
particular, drew so heavily.
Putting aside theoretical arguments as to the source of law and the extent
to which positive enactments may within one polity influence or abrogate
deeply rooted custom or conceptions of morality (the problem of "constitu-
tional" limits on state power), it is no great task to establish on empirical
evidence large areas of common conception between the English and continental
systems. Particularly was this true before the problems of modern industrial-
ism gave birth to a spate of statutory reforms consciously aimed at collective
goals. A shared culture based on Christian ethics joined with a common faith
in classical capitalism and individualism to universalize many ideas. Like the
political and economic philosophy it reflected, virtually all substantive doc-
trine was heavily weighted toward individual morality: the sanctity of prop-
93. See, generally, Sack, Conflicts of Law in the History of the English Law, in 3
LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935, at 342 (1937), tracing the jurisdictional prob-
lems of the common law in considerable detail.
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erty and contract; the duties of matrimonial status; the mans rea element to
crime; even, perhaps, the idea of reasonable conduct that characterized much of
tort law. At a sufficiently abstract level it is easy enough to relate doctrine to both
ideology and value system, and to state, again on empirical evidence, that before
and even at the time of Story's writings the ideology and value system, as well
as much derivative doctrine, was widely shared by "civilized" nations.01
There was room within general rules for differences based on different customs.
And there were of course other differences of administrative detail, method and
terminology. Similar policies might be differently implemented, and those
arbitrary lines essential to law administration might be differently drawn. The
derivative nature of legal doctrine-the joining of policy to abstract fact pat-
terns through the intermediary stage of composite doctrine-prevents a hard
and fast line between the policy and the implementing doctrine.
Even at the risk of considerable oversimplification one is tempted to explain
the different approaches to conflicts between the continental and English
systems largely as reflections of different judicial method. Although it con-
tained an element rooted in jus gentium, English private law was by and
large a matter of remedies; historically its whole development had been in
terms of expanding writs not rights. Statutes were few, loosely worded and
drafted largely in terms of command to judges, hence in procedural language.
Rights did not have their theoretical origin in the positive law, but rather in
custom and morality-principles not formally tied down to political boun-
daries. The civilian, on the other hand, was greatly concerned with the
other side of the coin. He, too, universalized his rights, but the limits of
judicial authority were defined in terms of these rights (not writs) with their
source in the written provisions of codes, statutes and ordinances. Experi-
encing conflicts problems long before the English and in far greater quantity,
the European courts quite naturally attempted to work out differences through
techniques of interpretation, and began to speak, therefore, of laws entitled
to extra-territorial effect, or what we might call faith and credit. Similar
local statutes could, in theory at least, be similarly interpreted as to operative
scope and effect, thus preserving the unity of the larger whole.95
The result of a particular case might be the same under either approach, and
for essentially the same reasons however expressed, but the Anglo-American
judge did not hesitate to view law as judgment. "Jurisdiction" for the civilian
became predominantly connected with the applicable written law; for the
common lawyer, with the competency of the court to decide.96 Civilians con-
tinued the -effort to establish a logical system of selecting applicable "law"
94. Both Story and Savigny depend on this common quality to justify their interna-
tionalism, explaining it in terms of the influence of Christianity and commerce. See STORY
7; SAVIGNY 17.
95. This was the technique which dominated conflicts on the continent for five cen-
turies. See note 90 supra.
96. See Sack, supra note 93. He points out that while there were no conflicts of laws
there were conflicts of jurisdictions (i.e., whether triable at common law or admiralty),
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(i.e., written rules). Story, admitting that foreign rules were important and
often decisive factors in the judgment of a court, could not square such an
approach with either wisdom or common sense-not to mention sovereignty.
He was wary of the overgeneralization, the "lump concept" analysis which
sought to allocate competence among states without regard to the purpose or
policy of particular prescriptions and the variant facts of a particular case.
The Anglo-American Shift to Positive Law
Anglo-American law in the nineteenth century underwent progressively
important changes in policy, in form and in theory. Despite the ingenious
efforts of Mansfield to reform common law anachronisms, the task proved too
overwhelming for the techniques of interstitial policy-making and the intel-
lectual capacity of his certainly less gifted and probably less motivated brethren.
Reform initiative shifted to the legislature; statutory law became increasingly
important from the Reform Act of 1832 to the present. The shift to a legis-
lative base forced a corresponding shift in legal theory, and John Austin pro-
vided it in the same year with the notion that all law emanated from sovereign
command. Thus it was possible to justify changes in the common law by
giving legitimacy to the voice of Parliament as an expression of the will of the
popular sovereign not merely as to remedies but as to rights as well. Bentham,
of course, had already pointed out that judges were, in fact, legislatingi by
and large he did not like their legislation and placed his confidence in the
elected representatives. So did Austin. Influenced strongly by Bentham he
sought with remarkable skill to introduce a necessary and important logical
symmetry into English legal method. His extraordinary powers of case
analysis brought a hitherto unruly body of doctrine into an orderly pattern.
In doing so, of course, he intentionally removed the element of conscious
policy formulation by judges. What he did not and could not remove were
the inherent limits of both logic and language to the adjudicative process.
But, once the impact of his jurisprudence was felt, judicial policy formulation
was disclaimed in practice as well as theory, and was reduced to an uncon-
scious factor in decision making by judges.
The impact of Bentham and Austin on Dicey and Beale is apparent.
The view that law has its source in sovereign command led to the statement
that courts always applied their own law. The same essential idea, that rights
were the creature of sovereign command, led to the theory of vested rights-
rights created by a foreign sovereign but recognized and enforced by local
law. The prohibition against judicial policy-making gradually made itself felt
by freezing choice of law precedent and, eventually, forcing courts to the
spurious use of decided cases and to a methodology which depended too heavily
on stare decisis. Dicey, with only English law to concern him, stopped there.
and that "jurisdiction" was a mixture of judicial and legislative jurisdiction. Id. at 356-57.
The common law and civilian approach are contrasted in Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts
Over Foreigners, 26 HARv. L. REV. 283 (1913).
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His was the relatively simple problem of stating what foreign rights an English
court would recognize. 7 But Beale had the infinitely more complicated job
of restating not a single law of conflicts, but forty-eight different laws of the
conflict of laws, all of which he sought to bring into an orderly pattern and
theory. Because he was working within a single legal heritage and similar
legislative enactments, he took an approach not unlike the early civilians whose
objective of logical universalism was close to his own. The universalist
quality of the Restatement, so seemingly inconsistent with its adherence to the
sovereignty of the forum, was an implied concession to a felt need of avoiding
judicial legislation by imposing rigid choice of law rules.
Yet, particularly in its American context of vested rights, positivism was
substantively a liberalizing influence. American judges were dealing with a
number of statutory modifications of harsh common law doctrine. Early de-
cisions rejected sister state enactments, for example, wrongful death statutes,
on the grounds that such laws were "penal,"98 or involved "procedure," 0 or
were opposed to the forum's "public policy."'1° The result was to deny the widow
a remedy except when the defendant was foolish enough to wander back to the
state of his tort within the period of limitations. Such decisions are annoying.
It is, I think, no surprise that the obligatio theory of Justice Holmes was
voiced in a similar fact context, 01 and echoed later by Cardozo when he re-
jected the lower court's finding that the Massachusetts wrongful death statute
was against New York's public policy.' 0 2 The peculiar combination of a jus
gentium with regard to rights and local provincialism with regard to remedies
that characterized the common law did not make fertile soil for foreign statutes
expanding traditional remedies or, for that matter, creating new rights. The
older attitude that the foreign plaintiff takes the forum's law as he finds it 103
97. Diczy, CONFLICT OF LAWS Lxv (5th ed. 1932).
98. McCarthy v. Chicago, Rock I. & Pac. R.R., 18 Kan. 46 (1877); Richardson v.
New York Cent. R.R., 98 Mass. 85 (1867).
99. MacKay v. Central R.R., 4 Fed. 617 (C.C.SMfl.N.Y. 1876) ; Woodard v. Michigan
So. & No. Ind. R.R., 10 Ohio St. 121 (1859).
100. Unless "similar" to the forum's substantive statute. The similarity doctrine was
in wide vogue after its formulation by the Court of Appeals in Leonard v. Columbia Steam
Nay. Co., 84 N.Y. 48 (1881), but was emphatically rejected by the same court some years
later in Cardozo's famous opinion in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E.
1.98 (1918). In the interval even the Supreme Court had approved it. Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593,604-05 (1892).
101. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). Here the circuit court
applied the lex fori, which would have given a different, perhaps even greater, recovery;
accordingly the case on its facts is perhaps more concerned with fairness to defendant than
plaintiff. That Justice Holmes was not always averse to curtailing the obligatio by cur-
tailing the remedy, see The Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914) (British law governs, but owners
entitled to benefit of American statute limiting recovery).
102. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
103. See, for example, the dicta of Mr. Justice Wilmot in Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr.
1077, 1084, 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 721 (K.B. 1760) : "But if a man originally appeals to the law
of England for redress, he must take his redress according to that law to which he has
appealed for such redress."
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tended to persist, even after the merger of law and equity and the introduction
of code pleading had removed local procedural bars to pleading a cause of
action that depended upon the provisions of a foreign statute unknown to
the forum.
Vested rights, therefore, had the impact of forcing awareness of the statu-
tory provisions of sister states whose laws were claimed applicable. Particu-
larly did this result occur when the full faith and credit clause was rediscovered,
applied to judgments and interpreted as a constitutional mandate reenforcing
foreign statutes and even foreign case law. 0 4 The difficulty, of course, was
the ever-present one of deciding whose "law" determined whose "law" vested
what "rights."
PoLIcY RATHER THAN FORMULA
Despite the opposition of Story and, though to a lesser extent, Dicey,105
there has always been a tendency to sell conflicts doctrine at wholesale.
Broad references have been its bane even before Beale entered with "legislative
jurisdiction," thus purporting to give rules a validity and force quite inde-
pendent of any reason for the reference. The method of phrasing conflicts
doctrine in terms of the "law governing" a wide category of events has created
whole areas of false problems, or, at least, real problems falsely stated.
"Characterization" and "renvoi" are prize instances.10 6
Characterization
There is no inherent reason why one body of doctrine, determinable in ad-
vance without consideration of its content, should govern multi-state transac-
tions. But even achievement of uniform doctrinal reference leaves the prob-
lem of determining the operative scope of the symbols used; that is, by whose
"law" are they characterized? For example, it is almost universally agreed
that torts are governed by the lex loci delicti and procedure by the lex fori.
The problem of characterization is whose law does one use to determine what
facts constitute a tort; or which state, if the events are multi-state, is the
locus; or what rules are procedural if the forum and the lex loci differently
regard a similar rule or rules. Renvoi occurs when the conflicts rule of the
lex loci would characterize the same facts differently and would not apply its
domestic rules.
Seeking to merge two or more legal systems is a task more intricate than
any formulaic, or "hornbook," method contemplates. Granted, many concep-
tions are to some degree universal; the notions of a delict, of property, of
marriage and of contract appear in all legal systems, and a wide area of similar
events would be grouped under the same general classification. But even
within one system the lines of demarcation are fuzzy; the conceptual pattern
104. See note 30 supra.
105. Dicmy, CONFLICT OF LAWS 8-9 (6th ed., Morris 1949).
106. See notes 52 and 53 supra.
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is intricately interwoven with doctrine to effectuate results and to meet the
social, political and economic pressures-the value preferences--of time and
place. In the common law, tort has sometimes been the device for expanding
contract, and vice versa. Procedure continues to play its important, sometimes
dominant, substantive role. Real property, once the focal point of the English
social, political and economic system (hence zealously protected against foreign
"law" for obvious though inarticulate reasons of policy), gives way to contract
doctrine as economic change in the means of production accelerates. Statute
interacts with case law as the law shifts, adjusts and readjusts. We read into
the past the conceptions of the present; with the clarity of hindsight we sub-
stitute function for purpose.
Legal doctrine always requires reinterpretation in the light of new facts
or contrasting doctrine or policies. In good measure ihis process is all that
is involved in characterization. It is complicated, as are all conflicts problems,
because states may disagree on conflicts doctrine itself (often a reflection of
different internal policies) and on the interpretation of verbally similar rules.
Whether or not another state would apply its internal rules to a given fact situ-
ation is always a potentially relevant, though not necessarily decisive, con-
sideration, for it adds an important dimension to the foreign internal rules
whereby one may determine their purpose. Renvoi in its "sitting and judg-
ing" meaning (how a potentially interested state would treat the same contro-
versy) may, as Dean Griswold has pointed out, °T be a measure of the scope
and intensity of the foreign domestic rule. If, for example, the domiciliary
state would not incapacitate its domiciliary in a particular interstate transaction,
there seems little reason for others to do so.'0 s Or if the lex loci (as deter-
mined by the forum) would not claim to govern a particular "tort" because it
would characterize the facts differently, or if it would regard another state as the
lex loci because, perhaps, all the acts of defendant took place there, it may
be that the forum should itself look to this third state.10 9 If, on the other
hand, the lex loci has previously characterized one of its rules as procedural
for conflicts purposes, that decision may merely reflect the importance it at-
taches to the policy involved, since, for reasons of history, "procedure" de-
veloped into a capacious grab-bag for local rules. The difficulty lies in the
emphasis given at the level of syntax to uniformity and in the previously dis-
cussed philosophical preconceptions about "law."
We introduce an unnecessary and misleading dimension to the resolution
of multi-law problems if we phrase conflicts questions as abstract determina-
tions of what "law" governs contracts, torts, real property, and so forth-
and then argue about the classification. The question as to what "law" governs
can be intelligently answered in terms of abstract categories of doctrine only
if the facts fit the pattern and policy which led to the reference and rule in the
107. See Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARv. L. Ray. 1165 (1938).
108. But see RESTATEMENT § 333 (law of place of making governs capacity).
109. Cf. Briggs, The Jnrisdictonal-Choice-of-Law Relation in Conflicts Riles, 61
HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1196-97 (1948).
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first place. Comprehensive rules of thumb such as the lex loci delicti rule
are helpful only as long as they work in the concrete, and only as long as
everyone uses the same legal shorthand. As soon as we move from familiar
and recurring fact situations which everyone characterizes as "torts" and
which all take place within one state, it becomes necessary to rethink the
rule in a comparative context with regard to the particular events and the
particular rules of interested states. This is a task which, of necessity, falls to
the court of the forum. If it is to be done intelligently the jtudge will have to
go back of customary conflicts doctrine to its purpose, and back of the invoked
internal rules to their purpose, evaluating insofar as he is able the interests
of the various states, not in geographical terms, but in terms of having their
prescriptions applied to these particular facts-not to similar facts occurring
locally. It is not necessary that similar facts occurring elsewhere, involving
different states and different prescriptions, be decided by the same hypothetical
internal law, and it was an unhappy day for conflicts when this fallacy became
popular.
The approach suggested is that which, I believe, the realists with their
"local law" theory were urging. I cannot see any essential difference between
it and the traditional methodology of the common law which Story advocated.
Differences lie only in the increased public concern about "private" law and
our resultant expanded sense of relevancy as to the factors to be weighed in
arriving at a proper result.
Capacity
Take, for example, the old chestnut, "capacity." It seems to me too clear
for intelligent argument that the only state with interest in capacity as such
is the domicil of the person involved. The usual purpose of the various rules
centering around capacity is to preserve the family relationship, or to protect
the (presumably) weak from their own follies. But there may well be limits
to the fairness of extending such protection to transactions entered into in
another state with citizens of that state where the customs, and consequently
"laws," are markedly different, and where it is possible to engage in business
transactions with persons of an age or sex elsewhere prohibited. Thus, the
forum might reject a claim based on the practice of the domiciliary state and
put the integrity of transactions innocently entered into ahead of the protec-
tion otherwise sought to be cast around the person of the defendant." 0 There
are often many substantially similar qualifications of capacity in local law."'
110. Even countries which view the personal law as governing capacity may make an
exception in favor of the lex loci contractus to protect an innocent party unaware of the
incapacity under the personal law. See, for example, article 29 of the French Draft Law
on Private International Law as adopted by the Commission for the Reform of the Civil
Code, April 5, 1951, translated by Nadelnann and von Mehren, and reprinted in 1 Am. J.
ComP. L. 416, 421 (1952) ; 1 RABEI. 186-90.
111. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAv. L. REV. 173,
198-92 (1933). Obvious examples are the gradual expansion of such exceptions as "neces-
saries" and remedies in "quasi-contract" for restitution or unjust enrichment.
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Or the court might go even further. Since many states have emancipated
women, to put the contracting party under a burden of inquiry as to the law
of the domicil in transactions negotiated elsewhere might be felt to place an
undue and undesirable restraint on commerce. Even knowledge by the plain-
tiff of defendant's domiciliary incapacity might be held irrelevant in the light
of a general policy of encouraging commercial activity." 2  Finally, if the
prescribed incapacity does not fit the normal pattern in concept-if it is in
the nature of a punishment rather than a protection, perhaps a denial of
civil rights-a foreign state might refuse altogether to enforce it on grounds
that it was penal or against local public policy; that is, that the quality of
the foreign law was beyond the competence of the judiciary to recognize or
was offensive to its strongly held ideas of proper punishment. 13
The first two examples above of refusals to give effect to a domiciliary
restriction on capacity have sometimes been expressed as though constituting
a contrasting rule on capacity; that is, "the law of the place of contracting
determines the capacity to enter into a contract."" 4 It seems to me that this
is an unhappy formulation, for it conveys none of the reasons that underlie
the protection of at least certain categories of transactions and thus gives
no intelligent guidance for future cases. Where the personal law would
emancipate, for example, there is unlikely to be any reason for setting aside
a transaction merely on the ground that had all the facts been local the
agreement would have been voidable. And there equally may be little reason
in generally extending the lex loci, or any emancipatory rule other than that
of the domicil, to noncommercial transactions." 5
Torts
In situations normally characterized as delicts there is widespread agree-
ment that the rules of the lex loci delicti ought to apply." 6 As in the case of
112. See Lorenzen, Territoriality, Piblic Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736, 748 (1924).
1.13. For example, foreign civil death statutes, whatever the reason or the similarity
of local laws, are usually disregarded in the forum. Cases are collected in Note, 6 U. Cmi.
L. REv. 288 (1939).
114. RESTATEMENT § 333.
115. A recurring problem-though seldom denominated as such-is "evasion" or
"fraude A la loi." Such problems occur with frequency in domestic relations, but are
complicated by the possibility of injury to an innocent party. For this reason the lex loci
celebrationis is commonly used even by the prohibiting state to determine (and preserve)
the validity of a marriage. RESTATEMENT § 121. Similarly, prohibitions on remarriage
after divorce are honored more in the breach than observance. See Kingsley, Remarriage
After Divorce, 26 So. CALIF. L. REV. 280 (1953), where the American cases are collected
and analyzed. In contract cases the problem is usually discussed in connection with the
problem of "autonomy" to select applicable law. See, e.g., 2 RABEL 400 (relating the
French "fraude" doctrine to public policy, but criticizing its application in particular cases) ;
cf. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 416 (1918) (holding that federal district
court should follow Texas public policy in refusing to enforce contract of guaranty made
in Illinois with Illinois bank which knew it might have to sue in Texas).
116. RESTATEmENT §§ 378, 379; 2 RABEL 235.
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crimes, the reason given is often predicated on the "territorial sovereignty" of
the state where the events take place. 117 The most difficult problems occur
when the events are not localized; when, for example, the acts are in one state
and the injury in another;118 or when there is a prior relationship between
the tortfeasor and the injured party or property; n19 or when questions of
vicarious liability are interposed.1 20
Internally, theories of tort liability vacillate between concepts of negligence,
or "wrongful" conduct, and absolute liability, allocating the economic risk, for
certain kinds of activity. The general trend has been in the direction of in-
creased liability, particularly in an insurable or commercial context. So, too,
has the trend of conflicts doctrine. Take for example the wandering dog who
bites abroad. Assume the law of the dog's residence requires proof of owner's
negligence, the place of the bite makes the owner absolutely liable, and suit,
probably of necessity, is brought in the former jurisdiction. In 1937, despite
its local rule, the Pennsylvania court applying New Jersey law held for the
plaintiff. 1 2 1 Conceptually an opposite result could have been reached by saying
117. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909).
The relation between interfering with the sovereignty of another state and the law vesting
the right is obvious. Savigny tended to view torts within his "imperative" (hence non-
exportable) category, at least where the same acts were not tortious at the forum. SAVIGNY
205-07; cf. Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (Ex. 1870) (the English rule). For a per-
suasive argument in favor of a more discriminating approach see Morris, The Proper Law
of a Tort, 64 Hazv. L. RFav. 881 (1951) (urging the same flexibility of approach to tort as
to contract).
118. The American view favors the place of injury. RESTATM .NT § 377. It has been
criticized, however, for its rigidity and lack of social policy orientation. STUMBERG, CON-
FLIcr OF LAWs 201-12 (2d ed. 1951). It may be an inaccurate reflection of case law as it
exists, and the result of historical accident. Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study
in the Method of Case Law, 19 TuL. L. Rxv. 4, 165 (1944). The civil law is commonly
said to adopt the place of acting. See 2 RABEL 303. The Germans have the best of both
worlds by giving plaintiff his choice. Id. at 304. On multiple contact cases generally, see
HANcocK, TORTs IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 171-256 (1942).
119. Often such problems (e.g., workmen's compensation, breach of warranty) may
sound in either contract or tort. Frequently they involve the capacity of one spouse to sue
another, thus adding to the classification potpourri the further potential ingredients of
personal law and procedure, or perhaps even public policy. See, e.g., Reed & Barton Corp.
v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934) (breach of warranty, lex loci delicti applied) ; Gray
v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934) (lex loci rather than personal law applied to
prevent suit by wife against husband) ; Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871) (suit in
contract for injury to train passengers); Dupont v. Quebec S.S. Co., 11 Queb. S. Ct.
188, 201-06 (1896) (injury on British ship, employment in Quebec; if British law applied,
it did not include fellow-servant defense, which was called contractual in origin, hence
governed by place of contract).
120. The English rule which requires the conduct to be tortious by English standards
stems from such a fact situation. The Halley, [1868] L.R. 2 P.C. 193, discussed in HAN-
coCm, op. cit. supra note 118, at 11-13. The most familiar contemporary fact situations are
the result of statutes imposing liability on the owners of motor vehicles. Scheer v. Rockne
Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934) ; cf. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), dis-
cussed in Beale, Two Cases on Jurisdiction, 48 HARV. L. REv. 620 (1935).
121. Fischl v. Chubb, 30 Pa. D. & C.. 40 (C.P. 1937).
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that the owner had done nothing to "subject himself to New Jersey law"-the
notion of the territorial omnipresence-particularly since the dog had wandered
some thirty miles. 1 22 The actual holding can be said to stem from the fact
that there is no "tort" until there is a bite, and hence the "place" of the tort
is the place of the bite-a view which favors an impact theory, or what in
criminal law is euphemistically called "objective territoriality." The honest
answer, however, lies in a changed "general jurisprudence" of tort liability.
An even stronger case can be made in a commercial context of injury from
commodities, where today there is very little doubt that the law of the place
of impact, if it imposes strict liability, will be applied even if the goods in
question were not shipped into or sold within the territory. 23 The general
trend of tort liability is sufficient to put the manufacturer or dealer on notice
of his potential liability even if the law at his place of business is less strict.
Very much the same result is likely in cases of vicarious liability even when
there is no proof that the principal has specifically "subjected" himself to the
particular foreign law in question, though limits may be reached. The owner
of a motor vehicle (in a context of familiar insurance provisions) is probably
liable for the acts of another driving with his consent even if the acts occur
in a place not included within the consent.124 But the situation is substantially
different when the state of impact seeks to impose common law liability on a
husband for the tortious conduct of a wife-at least when the couple is sepa-
rated-than it might have been a century or less ago.125
Conflicts doctrine, unlike public law, looks to an "exclusive" jurisdiction;
uniformity presses for finding the applicable "law" in universal terms without
122. See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934), where Judge
Hand refused to apply Ontario statute making automobile owner liable for driver's tort
without some proof that owner had "subjected himself" to Ontario law; cf. Cherwien v.
Geiter, 244 App. Div. 814, 279 N.Y. Supp. 553 (2d Dep't 1935) (refusing to apply local
statute to New Jersey bailment, even though New Jersey would have done so). But cf.
Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (New Jersey court application of New York statute
making owner liable held no violation of due process even though bailment took place in
New Jersey).
123. Cf. Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940) (sale in New York
but goods shipped to Ohio; court applied Ohio wrongful death statute and used Ohio
criminal statute to establish negligence per se). See Rheinstein, supra note 118, at 30-31. I
agree with Rheinstein that one can push the place of injury beyond forseeability only at
risk of considerable injustice to defendant, but I would push forseeability very far where
commercial or insurable conduct is involved.
124. See cases cited note 122 supra. The text goes beyond the decided cases, which
still talk consent, express or implied, to drive the car within the state where the injury
occurs. But once we imply consent we are at the threshold of forgetting it entirely. It
seems to me the risk of negligent driving by one financially irresponsible is better placed
upon the owner who places the car in his hands, then upon the victim of his carelessness.
And I believe today a court would so hold, whatever the doubts in 1935.
125. Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938). Judge Hand, who also
wrote the Scheer decision, see note 122 supra, does not need to regard these situations as
substantially different, for he finds a "consent" absent in both cases. To repeat, I believe
not consent but some sort of forseeable event within the place of injury, and perhaps some
control over its occurrence, are the important ingredients of Hand's "consent."
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taking into account variations in local doctrine at either the substantive or
conflicts level. Willingness to impose liability when the place of impact or
injury would do so should not exclude the possibility of imposing liability if
the rules of another state, the place of the acts or the agency, would do so on
the same multi-state facts.1 26 Admittedly, such liability is in the nature of a
windfall to plaintiff, but it is scarcely unfair to defendant and is consistent
with the thrust of tort doctrine towards increased liability. One might
doctrinally justify reference to that law either because the place of impact
would do so under its conflicts rule, or independently because the place of the
acts would apply its substantive law to these facts. Uniformity in terms of
prescribing one applicable "law" is not important in itself in a typical tort
context; there is little reason today for the forum not to pay deference to the
policy of any state with an interest in plaintiff's injury or defendant's conduct
if there is evidence that the policy of that state would extend to these facts
and if doing so would not violate due process as conceived by the forum. Here,
as elsewhere in conflicts doctrine, the emphasis given to the law of the "place
of tort" was an effort to persuade a foreign forum, normally the domicil of
defendant, to apply the law of the place of the events out of fairness to plain-
tiff and in deference to the interest of that state in both local conduct and
protection of persons locally resident. It was an attempt to give an objective
standard to recovery in terms of the wrong rather than the actor. Few states
would be willing to accept as a principle that liability should invariably depend
on the internal rules of the defendant's domicil. But few states would object
to more stringent rules of liability being imposed by the domicil if it desires
to do so.
The important distinction---obscured by insistence upon uniformity in the
abstract-is between "territoriality" as a sufficient contact to put plaintiff
or defendant on notice of potentially applicable foreign rules, and "territori-
ality" as a system of allocating competence to prescribe policy. Both depend,
but for different reasons, on the nature of the rules as read in the light of
their purpose. There are limits, domestically measured by due process, to
which a state can in fairness seek to prescribe as to persons, property and acts
unconnected physically with its territory, and these limits depend upon the
general familiarity of the rule coupled with the extent and quality of the
contact. Given the competency to prescribe--"legislative jurisdiction" if you
will-there are further questions for the court of the forum to consider:
(1) whether the rules apply to these particular facts, and (2) what are the
prescriptions and policies of the forum and of other states with contacts with
regard to the same events. Traditional conflicts theory and doctrine attempt
to make choices of law on the basis of the events alone. I would add the
additional variable of the provisions and policies of the potentially applicable
laws-considerations now present but hidden in ideas of "characterization,"
"renvoi" and "public policy."
126. See Mforris, supra note 117, at 885; STUrnrBG, CONFLICT OF LAws 201-12 (2d ed.
1951).
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Private Agreements
A goodly portion of conflicts cases have come up in situations where,
within broad limits, the dominant policy of all states has been to enforce
private arrangements that are concerned with the disposition of property, or
with contracts for sale of goods or for personal services. Much of the doctrine
revolves around the catch-all of "intent"-if the relevant intent is not reason-
ably clear from admissible evidence, it is derived from rules that are the
result of a mixture of past experience, custom and policy. Positive prescrip-
tions have often dealt with "formalities," presumptions with regard to the
meaning of words and phrases, and remedies available in specific instances.
Even among states with a common legal heritage and common customs it is
not unusual to find the same policy refined through precedent into slightly
different rules that produce somewhat varying results. "Close cases" go
opposite ways in neighboring states, creating prospectively different disposi-
tions of future controversy. Many such differences are not intensely felt;
judges may, in fact, prefer the foreign rule but feel bound in local matters, by
their predecessors in office.
Lorenzen in his intensive study of contracts 127 observed and approved a
marked tendency of courts to uphold contractual obligations if any "law"
with which there was a substantial contact would do so. Cavers 128 has
pointed out a similar phenomenon in the case of inter vivos trusts, where the
dominant policy is clearly in favor of fulfilling the intent of the settlor, the
consequences of frustration comparatively drastic, and differences in rules
often minor. The same is true of disposition by gift or will. 129 Marriages,
too, have generally been upheld as valid despite prohibitions expressed in the
rules of the state of nationality or domicil at the time of marriage,130 and
there are many cases where doctrine has been manipulated to favor rights
stemming from legitimation or adoption' 31 -at least once these concepts were
127. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J.
565, 655, 673 (1920), 31 YALE L.J. 53 (1921).
128. Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARV. L. Rav. 161, 167-
68 (1930). New York, a particularly important center of administration, has gone to great
lengths to uphold a trust. Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N.Y. 30, 35 N.E. 407 (1893); Cross
v. United States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892).
129. While the law of domicil governs personal property and the law of situs controls
real property in Anglo-American law, the reference in both cases includes statutory pro-
visions of those states aimed at preserving the disposition. See Lorenzen, The Validity of
Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Forum in the Conflict of Laws, 20 YALE L.J. 427
(1911) ; CHESHiRE 519-43. Cases and statutes are collected in Annots., 2 L.RtA. (as.)
408 (1906); 169 A.L.R. 554 (1947).
130. See note 115 supra. E.g., Noble v. Noble, 299 Mich. 565, 300 N.W. 885 (1941)
(youthful marriage; parties intended to avoid prohibition of domicil). The Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act has been withdrawn from the active list. HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS
64 (1943).
131. E.g., In re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945) ; Moretti's Estate,
16 Pa. D. & C. 715 (Orphans Ct. 1932).
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firmly embedded in the public mind and conscience and, therefore, in the
"general jurisprudence." Widows and children have generally had the best
of all possible laws when, for example, the issue was their share of an estate.
1 32
And, significantly, uniform statutes and treaties have generally aimed directly
at substantive problems rather than seeking solutions through appropriate
choice of law rules.133
There is much wisdom in decisions which voice the dominant policy of all
states involved and decline to frustrate expectations because of non-compliance
with a particular technicality. The argument for firm choice of law rules to
give certainty assumes compliance, rather than noncompliance, with a par-
ticular rule. The need for protecting expectations is, however, better effectuated
by selecting any law reasonably complied with than by insisting upon one
particular law. It would be a strange jurisprudence which would preserve
a mechanical rule at the expense of legitimate expectations.
As in the field of torts, these decisions have followed the thrust of substantive
policy. The trend internally has been toward carving out exceptions to rules re-
quiring formalities and away from mechanical application of such intent-frustrat-
ing devices as the rule against perpetuities applied in the "unborn widow"
context. The operative impact of the Statute of Frauds has been diminished
by the expansion of the "fraud" exception and the action in reliance doctrine;
the parole evidence rule has had many of its teeth removed; even the Statute
of Wills, by judicial and legislative modifications, is far less exacting than the
older jurisprudence had it; flexible doctrine with regard to laches and estoppel
is always at hand to preserve a voidable marriage or divorce.
A general drift of legislative and judicial response to social change is often
discernible, even if lag exists within several polities. If choice of law can be
used to select the "better" rule, the temptation to do so may be irresistible, and
may even pave the way for local change. Legislative backwardness with regard
132. E.g., the much debated case of Rosa Anton v. Bartholo, Cour d'appel d'Alger,
Dec. 24, 1889, [1891] Clunet Journal du Droit Int. Priv6 1171, discussed in ROBERTSON,
CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws 158-63 (1940), and Morse, Characteriza-
tion: Shadow or Substance, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 1027, 1031 (1949).
133. Among the United States the approach of the uniform laws has been either to
create common substantive rules (e.g., the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform
Sales Act) or to effectuate a prescribed result (e.g., Uniform Marriage Evasion Act,
Uniform Wills Act), and not to allocate jurisdiction to prescribe. Internationally the diffi-
culties of marrying civil and common law concepts make anything save substantive resolution
very difficult. The Hague Conventions of 1902 and 1905 on aspects of family law have
not been successful because of substantive policy differences. The Convention on Bills of
Exchange and Cheques of 1930 and 1931, as well as those dealing with Arbitration clauses
(1923) and Foreign Arbitral Awards (1927), have been more worthwhile owing to the
absence of significant variations in the substantive laws and policies. One could conclude
that where the facts are not localized, as in commercial transactions, it would be very nearly
as easy, and far more productive, to work at common codification of substantive rules
and policies. The Latin Americans have had somewhat more success with the Montevideo
treaties (1889, revised 1940) and the Codigo Bustamante (1928). For a general discussion
see 1 RABEL 29-41; WOLFF 46-51.
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to adoption or legitimation, for example, should not be construed as a "public
policy" in opposition to a status generally recognized and favored by the public.
Anachronistic precedent with regard to commercial practice ought to be modi-
fied in many instances, and if choice of law is a convenient interim step to
judicial or legislative repeal, it should be used as such. 3 4 And, finally, where
two doctrinally different devices are used to fulfill a common policy-a
property settlement by marriage contract vs. a statutory share-a choice which
gives the widow the benefit of the more favorable distribution may well be the
best fulfillment of the social policy of both states and the human expectations
which underlie both rules. 13t
But policies change, and choice of law precedent too can be out of date.
Freedom of contract has been more and more circumscribed in the name of
"public policy," and for a variety of reasons. Where bargaining inequality
exists, regulation by statute and decision has moved "bargain" away from
intent in the direction of obligation. Precedent founded on the assumption
of unsupervised negotiation is often inappropriate. Usury laws, for example,
were not particularly popular with courts at the height of economic liberal-
ism, and while a judge might not close his eyes to explicit and crude evasion,
winking was not unknown; the lender could likely get the benefit of the
higher of two percentages in an interstate contract. 136 Contemporary small
loan legislation is a horse of a different color, 3 7 to be scrutinized far more
rigorously for compliance which protects the borrower and prevents evasion
of local policy. The growth of retail credit and expansion of commercial lend-
ing institutions have changed the nature of the problem and the attitude with
which choice of law in this area is approached. Obviously where the lender
is doing business locally he ought not and will not be permitted to transfer a
loan negotiated locally to another "law" by the terms of the basic contract.
There are many areas where, in some degree, bargain has given way to
status, freedom to regulation: sale of securities, insurance, employment, public
utilities, to mention only a few. How far one state may extend its protective
policy ought not to depend on choice of law rules previously invoked in differ-
ent factual contexts and expressing different policies. "Intent" as to govern-
ing law is clearly irrelevant where evasion is the issue; places of contracting
134. Apparently this is the view of the proposers of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See § 1-105 (applying the Code to controversies that have any contact with the forum).
A less dogmatic technique is sometimes employed by courts that invoke a choice of
foreign law to avoid their own outmoded precedent, but the cases are difficult to tie down
because of the flexibility of conflicts doctrine. See, e.g., Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v.
File Bros. Wholesale Co., 110 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1940) (applying foreign law but sug-
gesting that the lex fori is also moving to the same "modern rule" of liquidated damages).
135. See Neuner, Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws, 20 CAN. B. REv. 479,
485 (1942).
136. See GooDRuCH 334, and cases cited therein.
137. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN TEE LAw, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 169-71 (rev.
ed. 1950) ; Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
1072, 1077-78 (1953).
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or performance may or may not be indicative, because they are themselves
subject to bargain. Attempts to evade local prohibitions are likely to fail if
the enacting state has a voice in the disposition of the case. If, on the other
hand, a transaction is on the margin of those regulated, a court may still ignore
even a doctrinally substantial contact to preserve a good faith transaction. 38
The problem is not-and, indeed, never has been---one of finding the greatest
number of contacts, or the "center of gravity" of the transaction, or the
"proper law" by crude addition of contacts,139 but one of measuring the
policies of the several states against the facts of the particular controversy,
the rules against their origin and purpose. These formulae are useful only
in that they are flexible. Whether a foreign rule can in fairness or does in policy
touch a particular transaction is dependent upon an evaluation of the policy,
the parties, the events and the contact. Recurring commercial transactions are
likely to be subjected to a higher degree of regulation than non-recurring ones,
and interstate or international business enterprises to more exacting knowledge
of local and foreign regulations than individuals doing business on a smaller
or more incidental scale. And the probability that a state will be able to
effectuate its regulation in the former cases without running the rapids of
choice of law has been enhanced by expanding concepts that may give that
state "jurisdiction" to make a final judicial determination.
SOVaIGN POWER AND POLICY
Under a rational view of conflicts, each sovereign should use its bases of
power to secure maximum effect for its policy in and with regard to the inter-
national or interstate community. To do so requires invoking principles that
are at least potentially persuasive as international precedent, and which,
therefore, take cognizance of the policies and power of other states. If they
are to fulfill their function as a stabilizing force in the world community
conflicts rules should urge and imply reciprocity on like terms. The objective of
each state should be to effectuate the compatible policies of all. This objective
does not require uniform choice of law rules. In fact, except where internal
laws are similar and facts localized, the contrary may be true, because what
the various laws provide, and with what purpose, should be conscious factors
in choice. It does, however, require a far more discriminating clarification of
underlying goals and the identification of facts, or "contacts," with the various
policies. That we are slowly progressing toward such an approach is reason-
ably clear.140 But a tremendous amount of doctrinal pruning remains to be
done.
138. E.g., In re Motor Products Mfg. Corp., 90 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 695 (1937) (California "blue sky law" not applied to void transaction valid
by Missouri law despite substantial California contract).
139. The problem of "proper law" is qualitative and not quantitative. It is, therefore,
misleading to talk about an "accumulation of contact points as paramount." See, e.g.,
HARPER, TAINTOR, CARNAHAN & BROWx, CONFMlCr oF LAWS 7 (1950).
140. As evidenced by such juristic formulae as "proper law," "minimum contacts,"
"balancing of governmental interest," "convenience" and, of course, "public policy"-all
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Disagreement in the international arena is often resolved at a relatively
low level of intensity by the fortuitous distribution of power to enforce a given
prescription within territorial limits; at a higher level of intensity by diplomatic
techniques ranging from minimum compromise and negotiation to maximum
coercion. In interstate matters the Supreme Court is available to play an
arbitral role; uniform state laws and national legislation equate with treaties
as means for resolving problems through substantive principles. There is
clearly a national interest, recognized by the Constitution, in compatibility.
National controls over monetary problems and interstate commerce, in par-
ticular, remove many of the more intense areas of dispute from the competence
of the states.
In the final analysis what rules will be applied to what persons and events
in the international community with what consequences depends upon what
decision-maker possesses and exercises effective power. This simple truism
has always distressed those with a rigid conception of "law," the more so
because possession of power in its narrow sense of coercion over persons and
property within territorial limits may be completely fortuitous. Hence the
desire to move back a step in time and speak of enforcing vested rights-to
make power effective in terms of legislative prescription rather than enforce-
ment. Nevertheless, descriptively at least, power seems to be the determinant
of policy and, therefore, of law-a formulation that puts cart before horse in a
quite unsatisfactory way and is, in addition, quite misleading.
Jurisdiction and the Significance of Power
"Jurisdiction" is in wide vogue to describe the competency of the various
decision-makers in the international community to prescribe value changes.
It has a solid sound, well suited to the dignity of the judicial process despite
the fact that it is used indiscriminately to refer to a wide variety of claims
and concessions, actual and potential, variously phrased, interpreted, admini-
stered and qualified with regard to persons, events and wealth, both for de-
scriptive and preferential purposes.
It has been frequently observed that it is in terms of "jurisdiction," as con-
trasted to "choice of law," that public and private international law share
common ground.141 Certainly "jurisdiction" is the semantic focal point of
interstate regulation under both the due process and full faith and credit
clauses of the Constitution, and, as already stated, similar ideas underlie less
refined international equivalents.
Jurisdictional theory is customarily phrased in terms of the broad claims
made by the "personal" and "territorial" sovereigns. There has been little
of which require some evaluation of policy vis-a-vis particular facts. There remains the
institutional difficulty of overruling or avoiding precedent based on different assumptions
in a field of law relatively untouched by legislation.
141. See, e.g., 1 BEA.E § 1.10. The various views are collected and reported in Steven-
son, Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REv..561, 564-65 (1952).
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effort to relate specific claims to either particular prescriptions or policies,
largely, it would seem, for fear of creating limiting precedent on state power
to act in future contingencies. Story expressed what is still the usual Anglo-
American or "territorial" view by bottoming his theory on the exclusive
competency of a state to regulate persons resident and property situate with-
in its borders. 142 Principally he used a concept of territorial sovereignty-the
monopoly of formal law enforcement within geographic boundaries-to justify
the international integrity of judicial "acts of state" ;143 that is, judgments
rendered and enforced through local process. The use of the word "exclusive"
reflected both sovereignty and international res judicata. He assumed comity
-deference by the deciding court to the views of other interested sovereigns.
But his concern for what he regarded as excessive claims of civilians for the
"personal" law led him to speak of jurisdiction over "contracts made and
acts done" within a state, clearly a choice of law idea.144 He acknowledged
the jurisdiction of a sovereign over its nationals anywhere, but viewed it
as subsidiary to the competency of the territorial state,145 once again indicating
his concern lest the national sovereign seek on the one hand to immunize its
citizens from local sanctions or, on the other, to claim their extradition as a
matter of international obligation.
Beale emphasized the choice of law aspect of Story's maxims by hardening
comity into vested rights, though he too, somewhat inconsistently, insisted on the
finality of judgment by a court with jurisdiction irrespective of the law chosen.
Elevating judgments, at least where locally executed, to constitutional status
inevitably reduces choice of law doctrine to local rather than international
standing save, perhaps, at its extremes. When forced to elect between doc-
trinal uniformity and territorial power, Beale could not help but cast his lot
with the latter. But while Story and the later realists did so with gusto,
Beale was a reluctant partner in diversity. To repeat, underlying the different
attitudes were different philosophies of law and judicial function. Modern
iconoclasts have shared with Story a view according judges a discretion which
the more conservative Austinians reserved for legislatures. To Dicey and
Beale "legislative jurisdiction" for legislatures and "legislative jurisdiction"
for courts are different things: the former goes the limits of international
due process; the latter is simply quick-frozen choice of law precedent of the
forum viewed as though it were positive law of a foreign sovereign capable of
vesting rights. 46
142. STORY 28. For its significance, see id. at 33-34.
143. In its judicial usage "act of state" has been confined to executive acts, while
judgments have depended on the "jurisdiction" of the rendering court. There seems little
reason to make the distinction, and some commentators do not. See, e.g., Mann, The
Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. RIv. 42, 53 (1943).
144. STORY 28.
145. Id. at 31-33.
146. Compare RESTATE.AENT §§ 5 and 7 with §§ 62, 63 and 64. Hence problems of
"preliminary question," "classification" and "renvoi."
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In all theories the Gordian knot has been cut, "law" has been distilled from
"laws" by insisting on the freedom of a sovereign with jurisdiction, at least
where fortified by local power, to effectuate its choice of law. Territorial
sovereignty in terms of enforcement got linked with traditional Anglo-
American emphasis on local service at the time of bringing suit. Holmes, for
example, in a burst of realism, concluded that the "foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power,"'u 47 a half-truth which, though immediately qualified, has
misled others to overstate the importance and function of the forum and to
understate claims of other sovereigns to both judicial and legislative com-
petency which the forum may be prepared, at least on a reciprocal basis, 148
to recognize. Resting in part upon the truism that the effectiveness of any
prescription ultimately depends upon power to coerce compliance and in part
upon the importance of preserving self-determination in the exercise of local
power (sovereignty again), it has obscured rather than clarified other relevant
policies.
To the decision-maker, possession of power does not determine appropriate
policy, the wisdom and propriety of its exercise or the substantive rules chosen
as the guide to adjudication. The policy so formulated is, of course, one related
to problems of the larger community: the fact that there exist only state courts
to determine disputes involving interstate facts, the fact that policy prescription
and administration are geographically organized, the fact that power is shared.
It would be footless to ignore local power or the valid policy of self-deter-
mination it encompasses; Holmes' aphorism is scarcely as "factually unsup-
ported and functionally unsupportable" as Ehrenzweig would have it.149 To
ignore it would be to ignore the final determinant of whose policy, and there-
fore what policy, prevails. To that extent Holmes, in company with Story,
147. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Cf. Direction Der Disconto-Gesell-
schaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22, 28 (1925) (reaffirming power but further
qualifying its impact by observing that a state "prefers to consider itself civilized and to
act accordingly").
148. Reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments has been implemented by treaty.
E.g., Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Convention regarding the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments, Copenhagen, 1932, 139 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY
SERIES 165, 181 (1933-34); Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 23
& 24 GEo. V, c. 13, extended by Convention to reciprocating countries. The Supreme Court
has suggested a doctrine of reciprocity as a condition to enforcement of foreign judgments,
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895), but this doctrine is difficult to apply because
someone has to move first without the assurance. Many countries, however, apply the
rule. See Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YAIX L.J.
188, 194-99 (1919). Neither the full faith and credit clause nor Hilton are binding on
state or (since Erie) federal courts, but state courts are inclined to give broad recognition
to foreign judgments without requiring reciprocity. See Reese, The Status in this Country
of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 783, 784-87 (1950). There is early
authority for full faith and credit as part of the law of nations. Kennedy v. Cassillis, 2
Swans. 313, 326, 36 Eng. Rep. 635, 640 (Ch. 1818) ; see Rheinstein, The Constitutional
Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 775, 791-96 (1955).
149. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296 (1956).
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was on solid, if self-evident, ground. But equating jurisdiction and power in
this sense neither refutes nor even takes issue with those who insist that law
is cast in more purposeful terms. Of course it is, and rightly so; each sovereign
uses its power to effectuate what it conceives to be appropriate policy, and over
a wide area there is agreement or, at least, tolerance. So long as formal au-
thority is organized and administered territorially, there is a mutual and
reciprocal interest-a "sense of the inconveniences which would otherwise re-
sult"-in extending areas of tolerance. The strongest case, of course, is presented
by the executed judgment or decree-the exercise of territorial power-in-fact
by a foreign official. Whether courts concede the "jurisdiction" of the foreign
sovereign or refer directly to the Act of State doctrine, plaintiffs are normally
relegated to diplomatic channels for redress. Thus where a sovereign possesses
and exercises physical power, his competency to do so will rarely be questioned
in courts abroad.
Judicial equation of jurisdiction with power to enforce a prescription within
territorial limits is, then, less an endorsement of principle than an acceptance
of fact. It merely recognizes the power realities; the deficiencies of a legal
system involving multiple decision-makers, limited power and differing doc-
trine; and the circumspect role of judges in resolving political problems. It
need not be sanctified as principle and, in fact, a different result may well obtain
for prescriptions unreduced to faits accomplis. There are degrees of policy
cross-reference-res judicata, deference to the views of other sovereigns, and
the possibility of political complications.lao But these considerations are less
strongly felt where the complication of territorial sovereignty is removed. Legis-
lative or judicial acts of state unaccompanied by an exercise of local power
stand on a lesser footing in the international community.
It scarcely requires argument that physical power over the defendant, or his
property, is indefensible as the exclusive criterion of either legislative or judicial
jurisdiction. No one seriously asserts otherwise. Venue in all countries is
linked with fairness and convenience, most often measured by domicil or resi-
dence, the place of relevant acts or events or property, or prior agreement. 15 '
The application of legislation to persons or events is, like all rules, a function
150. "But it appears a serious breach of international comity, if a state is recognized
as a sovereign independent state, to postulate that its legislation is 'contrary to essential
principles of justice and morality' . . . a casus belli." Scrutton, L.J., in Luther v. Sagor,
[1921] 3 K.B. 532, 558-59 (C.A.). While undoubtedly an overstatement, Scrutton's point
is nonetheless valid. In effect the justification of the Court's decision in United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), rests on the same premise, for the Russian confiscations
did not improve in due process by the political settlement made by the United States as a
step to recognition.
151. Vhat in intra-state controversies is "venue" becomes "jurisdiction" when a state
line is crossed. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296-303 (1956) ; Foster, Place
of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1217 (1930) ; Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate
Application of Intrastate Metlods of Adjustment, 44 HARv. L. Rv. 41, 43-47 (1930).
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of its purpose, limited only by the due process principle that the defendant
should have had fair opportunity to apprise himself of its potential application,
and the legislative claims of other sovereigns to regulate differently the same
events. Ultimately, of course, enforcement depends upon the views of a sover-
eign with physical power to enforce. But there is no reason to invert a political
limitation into a legal principle.
The Constitutional Framework
Rather than resting solely on concepts of power conflicts rules operate within
and reflect a constitutional triad common to both the interstate and international
community: equal protection of the laws, or nondiscrimination against aliens;
due process, or denial of justice; and, more tentatively, what we term full faith
and credit, variously expressed as comity, jurisdiction and respect for foreign
acts of state. Equal protection and due process have considerable seniority.
Except in the context of executed judgments or other "territorial acts," full
faith and credit is as yet less developed. As soon as a foreign prescription in-
volves a departure from customary and widely shared standards it likely pre-
sents a political question, and courts have traditionally sought techniques and
doctrine that reduce the possibilities of political involvement. 152 The more
activities are regulated in the public interest, however, the more difficult it
becomes for the judiciary to abnegate decision.
Equal protection and due process are both aimed at protecting individual
expectations and insuring even-handed treatment of nationals and foreigners
in national courts. From relatively early times foreigners have been entitled to
access to courts and to impartial justice in the prosecution of their cause.1r 3
As defendant, too, a foreigner was entitled to all the protection that would be
accorded a national. In addition, as a requirement of due process, he must in
some way have subjected himself to the legal process, or law, of the sovereign
that seeks to prescribe with regard to his obligations or status. As the doctrinal
equation works out, it is perhaps no offense to the concept of equal protection
to limit claims to those set by the forum's substantive standards, provided that
a citizen would be treated in the same way; this was the approach of the com-
mon law with its emphasis upon local law, local rights and local procedure. But
in order to subject him to liability as defendant, due process requires some
152. A general rule that courts will not enforce foreign penal, revenue or political
laws, or foreign laws involving ordre public extere (international) has the effect of
avoiding political questions by requiring positive local legislation based on treaties. Absent
local positive law, courts abjure competence to discriminate among polities or to pass
on the substantive merits of the legislation.
153. See Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, 26 HARv. L. REv. 193,
196-97 (1913). The alien has progressed from the status of outlaw or enemy to some-
thing approaching equality with nationals. Both humanism and the growth of commerce
have been factors in his improved status; the modern growth of nationalism has limited
certain substantive privileges. Access to courts was necessary to the growth of trade and
commerce. A brief history is contained in BORCHARD, THE DIpLOm ATIc PROTECrON OF
CITIZENS ABROAD 33-36 (1922). See also id. at 82, 333-40.
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reasonable connection between him and the substantive law applied, and, in
addition, the court's competence to hear the cause.
The due process problem is not particularly acute if the substantive rules are
viewed in universal terms, are in fact widely shared, and are derived from
custom and voluntary acts. Courts of admiralty, administering a common law
of the sea and the law merchant, were not consciously concerned with more
than variations of custom; the same was true of civil courts administering a
common law derived from Rome. But as we move away from substantive uni-
versals and obligations voluntarily assumed or conceded to those imposed by
community fiat for the realization of group values, the due process problem
takes on added dimension and difficulty. Positive law as the origin of rights
poses immediately the question of whose positive law is to be used, and leads
to a jurisdictional approach. Then, too, as rules are conceived as expressions
of sovereign policies rather than individual rights derived from nature or reason,
a political element enters the conscious appraisal of doctrine. It is one thing to
argue that a court should adopt a foreign rule of decision as its own because
fairness or justice demands it; it is quite another to do so simply because an-
other state has prescribed a particular result. The two may often equate, but
not necessarily. Problems as to the scope of judicial discretion arise.
To some extent the theory of "vested rights," although precluding a natural
law basis, actually made easier a "law of nations" approach.15 ' It gave courts
a verbalization and theory that permitted the use of foreign law even when it
was substantially different from that of the forum. But its adherents spoiled its
practical utility by their rigid insistence on the forum's choice of law precedent
as the measure of foreign legislative jurisdiction.' 55 Thus it became necessary to
think directly in terms of foreign claims to regulate the consequences of par-
ticular events, and to refuse recognition only if the claims ran counter to the
forum's conception of due process and public policy or the co-equal claims of
another state with regard to the same events. There is general agreement that
a state is primarily interested in events that affect its own safety, public order,
and the integrity of its social system; that is, the distribution of values among
those who, by virtue of citizenship or residence, identify themselves with a par-
ticular community and seek the protection of its laws. Therefore all claims to
prescribe value changes are cast, explicitly or inferentially, in terms of events
that directly concern the welfare of that community. As the impact upon values
of this national community becomes more remote the public interest is less and
the area of tolerance correspondingly increases.
154. See Nussbaum, The Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUm. L. REv. 189, 198 (1942) (calling "vested rights" a "tenet
somewhat analogous to the Law-of-Nations approach" of continental scholars).
155. The REsTATEMENT's position as to characterization by the forum's law (§ 7),
as well as the whole of the "Local Law" theory, constantly confuses the court's power
to decide with the relevant criteria of decision. The view here taken is that the limit of
legislative jurisdiction is due process by the forum's criteria, and within those limits it is a
court's task to arbitrate differences.
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A claim for the application of personal or territorial law is merely a general
statement of sovereign concern. Relationships among its own nationals or resi-
dents, particularly continuing ones like marriage and employment, may be of
importance to the sovereign wherever the relevant events occur. Similarly, the
conduct of others that affects local values may be sought to be subjected to its
standards. A state may or may not be concerned with acts of its citizens
abroad. In terms of its impact upon local values the place of occurrence of
relevant events may or may not have significance. In the absence of a specific
prescription embodying a definable policy it is not possible to determine ab-
stractly the scope of statutory or customary law with regard to either persons
or events.
The claims of a sovereign to control the conduct of its citizens are, in due
process terms, somewhat broader than the claims it can fairly make with regard
to others. There are obligations imposed upon nationals and residents that can
only be imposed on foreigners in more limited fact circumstances. An obliga-
tion to pay taxes, for example, cannot fairly be found against non-residents
except with regard to local transactions. The same is true of an obligation to
defend in local courts. And a general familiarity with legal standards of one's
personal law may permit that sovereign to extend its prescriptions to foreign
acts, when its policy is served by doing so, more freely than would be reason-
ably possible in the case of those whose contact with the sanctions invoked is
insubstantial.
Problems of Fair Notice and Venue: Power v. Convenience
Where a sovereign possesses physical power to enforce its judgments its
jurisdiction is unlikely to be questioned elsewhere. But the fact of physical
power does not legitimize its exercise, particularly if the claim is based on
foreign rules and the venue is an inconvenient one. But if the forum refuses
effect to foreign judgments unless executed abroad, there is a pressure to sue
only where power in fact is present. This practice may protect citizens against
foreign law and foreign judicial procedures, but it does so at the price of sacri-
ficing local claims against foreigners. Furthermore, as the movement of people,
the conduct of business and the dispersal of wealth become increasingly inter-
state, power over these elements is more widely shared. It is therefore to the
interest of all states to formulate reasonable criteria of proper place of trial
without regard to the existence of physical power to enforce.
If one could hypothesize uniform principles and standards of judicial ad-
ministration, the policy issues with regard to both claims and concessions to
render effective judgments would be drawn exclusively in terms of fair notice
and reasonable venue. Indeed, even with the possibility of different rules and
methods of fact-finding and trial, these policies would seem more important
than achieving doctrinal uniformity. When called upon to enforce a foreign
judgment, a state with power can always cast out decisions that offend its
sense of justice. The standards of what constitutes fair notice are relatively
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easy to formulate and are, in fact, widely shared.15 6 Venue is more difficult,
unless states were to agree that defendant has an obligation to appear wherever
venue is prima facie reasonable: for example, any state where connection with
the events is sufficiently evident to make possible the application of its law.
Such a principle, spurred by the ease of modern travel, has been slowly evolv-
ing, but it requires a counter-principle or practice which will cause dismissal
if venue is in fact unfair. While we have virtually arrived at this result in the
United States, 57 the counter-principle has not expressly appeared in other
countries.
Despite the difficulties inherent in different choice of law precedent and dif-
ferent modes of trial there is widespread effect given to foreign judgments
where the issues have been actively litigated, and wherever there is general
agreement that defendant has consented to foreign trial. 5 8 The actively litigated
judgment rests on a clear and common res judicata policy; the fairness of the
forum and the adequacy of the notice of trial is no longer in issue. The default
judgment, however, must rest merely on the obligation of defendant to have
responded to a summons. Notice alone is probably not enough (though the
development of an inconvenience doctrine may make it so), and, absent consent,
the fairness of the forum is not always easy to determine ex parte.
In early times competency to adjudicate tended to be confined in both theory
156. See note 148 supra. There is no disagreement that all reasonable steps to secure
actual notice should be required. In most cases there is no problem in securing actual
notice by personal service or service by registered mail. There may be some reluctance
to enforce a foreign judgment, whatever the reasonableness of the notice procedure, if
no actual notice was acquired. See Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France, Con-
vention Providing for the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
i1Matters, January 18, 1934, art. 3 § 1 (b), in 171 LEAGuE, oF NATIONS TREA'x SmIEs 183,
188 (1936).
157. As to having "jurisdiction," at least where there is no domicil, consent or presence,
a court must make "an estimate of the inconveniences" to defendant. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). Where there is local service, a court may
dismiss on the same grounds. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). A federal
court may in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties transfer the suit
to another district "where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952). The
relationship between the inconvenient forum doctrine and § 1404(a) is extensively analyzed
in Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv. 405 (1955).
158. See note 151 supra. Consent in advance is good common law and will be recog-
nized by common law courts. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931) ;
Feyerick v. Hubbard, [1902] 71 L.J.K.B. 509. A discussion of contractual consent is
contained in Childs, An Evaluation of the Techniques of Acquiring Personal Jurisdiction
over Non-Residents not Engaged in Business When a Simple Commercial Transaction has
been Breached, 38 Ky. L.J. 207 (1950). But where the consent is the result of unequal
bargaining power a default judgment may be refused enforcement. Jones v. Turner, 249
Mich. 403, 228 N.W. 796 (1930) (holding consent in cognovit note invalid by lex loci
contractus not operative to give Illinois jurisdiction). On the American practice generally
see Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 CoLum. L.
Rm. 153 (1949) ; Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50
COLtTM. L. Rxv. 783 (1950). On foreign practice see Lorenzen, The Enforcement of
American Judgments Abroad, 29 Y.LE L.J. 188 (1919).
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and fact to the domicil of defendant and only exceptionally elsewhere. At civil
law domicil was an important principle of venue, though not necessarily an
exclusive one.159 At common law venue originally was confined, by virtue of
the jury function, to the place of the occurrence of the relevant events. Only
after fact-finding no longer depended on the jury's knowledge as to what had
happened was it possible, by the use of a fiction, to lay venue in transitory
actions wherever the defendant could be found.160 Absent a voluntary sub-
mission or an accident, defendant was normally found where he lived. In both
systems the presence of the defendant in court as a necessary condition of a
fair trial underlay local service of process. Only as the capias writ ceased to
be the norm did the default judgment come into being. Notice replaced the
strong arm of the sheriff as the measure of procedural due process where suit
was brought at the domicil or residence of defendant. Something more was
needed, however, to impose an obligation to defend over nonresidents.
The norm of suit at defendant's domicil put a considerable burden upon
plaintiffs not always justified by the reciprocal difficulty of defending abroad.
A preferable venue in terms of ease of trial often remained the place where
events occurred, at least where this place could be localized. Furthermore,
states desirous of protecting local citizens began expanding their claims to
competence in cases where the foreign defendant could be said to have sub-
jected himself to local law at the time of the relevant acts. In cases generally
involving business done locally, torts committed locally or maritime claims,
there developed in England a justifiable pressure for litigation locally. In
admiralty and mercantile courts a practice of issuing writs of attachment
developed as a means of encouraging defendant's voluntary response to a sum-
mons served abroad, and as a fund for satisfaction of the claim. Writs served
abroad were not unknown in eighteenth century England and, where the cause
of action was governed by local law, were common on the continent as well.' 0 '
The practice was codified in England in the middle of the nineteenth century,
0 2
and English judges have since (and probably before) been empowered to issue
process abroad in cases where, broadly speaking, the cause of action is likely
governed by English substantive law.
One can equally well describe these practices as claims exceeding local power
or restrictions upon it. That is a question of fact. In theory they are not ex-
plicitly related to enforcement within the United Kingdom, although, since the
issuance of foreign summons is discretionary, the likelihood of effective dis-
159. See Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, 26 HAgv. L. REv. 193,
195 (1913).
160. See HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLCT OF LAWS 1-5 (1942); Sack, Conflicts
of Law in the History of the English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342, 370
(1937).
161. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The Power
Myth and Formn Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 299-300 (1956).
162. The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 VicT., c. 76 (now order XI of
the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1 THE ANNUAL PRACTICE 93-117 (1956)).
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position may be a factor influencing a judge. Obviously jurisdictional claims
based on such process do not necessarily go the full length of local execution
possibilities; equally they may go beyond. The latter possibility has caused
some embarrassment to English courts and commentators, 16 3 since England is
not quite willing to enforce a foreign default judgment arising from a similar
process. In an effort to rationalize what appear to be double standards it has
been said that England does not claim extra-territorial effect for such judg-
ments. But this argument, while it may be recognizing a practical reality in
that others might not recognize such a claim, is scarcely convincing as policy.
There is no good reason why a judgment good in England by English standards
should be marketed abroad at a discount. What is unfortunate is that there
has not been more emphasis upon the facts presented ex parte and the factors
influencing the claim, for the real justification of the practice is the evaluation
made of factors within judicial discretion.'6 It would, too, seem far less exor-
bitant to Americans if we remembered not only how far we have recently gone
in the same direction, but also that in neither English nor continental practice
is attachment of itself a basis for jurisdiction.
The roughly comparable development within the United States was given a
different emphasis by Pennoyer v. Neff.' 65 While English extra-territorial
service of process requires prima facie a local cause of action, Pennoyer put no
such restriction on attachment-pure and simple power-as a basis of jurisdic-
tion. "Personal judgments" required local service of process or consent; a local
cause, presumably, was not necessary. Local property could be attached or a
debt garnished by service on the debtor locally, and once again due process re-
quired no further justification of venue so long as the cause was "transitory."
In both instances power, unrelated to any sensible policy, emerged triumphant,
dressed strangely enough in the raiments of those "fundamental notions of
decency" embodied in due process of law.
Pennoyer's mechanical clinging to the ritual of local service, historically
traceable to the capias writ and the notion that power to compel appearance
%was the geographical limit of the sheriff's authority (as indeed it was and is),
proved too confining a concept. Fortunately other doctrine was at hand to
mitigate the strict side of personal jurisdiction. Most important was "doing
business" as a fictional measure of consent or "presence," originated as a con-
dition of corporate business but since expanded to other uses, at least where
163. E.g., CHESHIa 111.
164. Thus a writ would be refused where it appears that the forum is not convenient
or would not justify the expense to a foreigner of defending in England. George Monro
Ltd. v. American Cyanimid and Chemical Corp., [1944] I K.B. 432 (C.A.); Int re
Schintz, [1926] Ch. 710, 716 (C.A. 1925) ; cases are collected and analyzed in Note, 48
COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1948) (pointing out the many limitations in practice exercised for
reasons of fairness and due process). Despite these qualifications an American court has
refused to recognize such a judgment. Kerr v. Tagliavia, 101 Misc. 614, 168 N.Y.
Supp. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1917), af'd, 229 N.Y. 542, 129 N.E. 907 (1920).
165. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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the cause of action arises from local acts.'" The growth of "consent" through
bargain and fiat-from Hess 167 through Doherty 168 to International Shoe 16
and beyond 17Q-has piecemeal extended judicial jurisdiction very nearly to
legislative jurisdiction for those states that wish to push protection of local
plaintiffs on local causes of action to the limits of constitutional mandates. One
may very nearly say that among the United States the process of a state runs
to national borders where it can constitutionally claim legislative jurisdiction.
The restrictive holding of Pennoyer having been chopped away, a counter-
principle was needed. The Supreme Court discovered in 1947,17, with an assist
from scholars 172 and the overworked New York judiciary, 73 that the old
Roman doctrine of forum n-on conveniens had crept unnoticed into American
common law via Scotland. It has proved a viable doctrine to bring venue back
into conflicts principles. 1'74 Gradually, then, Holmes' physical power has been
limited and extended until it begins to accord with shared values. Except for
166. "[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as these obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). This language was relied
on by the Maryland court in upholding a statute allowing local suit where the only basis
was a contract made in Maryland. Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205
Md. 237, 260, 107 A.2d 357, 367 (1954). See Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 674 (1955).
Judge Hand believed that even prior to International Shoe it was "settled that a state may
subject a non-resident to the jurisdiction of its courts without personal service, if the action be
based upon an act of the non-resident while personally within the state." Deutsch v. Hoge,
146 F.2d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 1944) (dissenting opinion).
167. Hess v. Pawloskd, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
168. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
169. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
170. E.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). See Comment,
22 U. Cmi. L. REv. 674 (1955).
171. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). The inconvenient forum doctrine has been put in statutory
form empowering federal courts in diversity cases to transfer cases to another district
for reasons of convenience. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
172. Blair, The Doctrine of Forion Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1929) ; Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 I.. L. REv. 867 (1935).
173. E.g., Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y. Supp. 619 (1st Dep't 1903).
Cases are discussed in Blair, supra note 172, at 30.
174. If the test of jurisdiction adopted by International Shoe is qualified by further
considerations of convenience, there seems no persuasive reason not to extend (if we
have not already done so) state process throughout the nation wherever there is a prima
facie claim to legislative jurisdiction. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88(d) (1951) (foreign
corporations subjected to suit for contracts made, or liability for acts done, within state) ;
Comment, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 674 (1955). Ehrenzweig favors interstate venue in a con-
venient forum. See his recent article, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
Power Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE LJ. 289, 312 (1956).
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purposes of preserving assets, attachment and garnishment have virtually out-
lived their utility. They were never really important in notice terms (the Pen-
noyer rationale) and, in common with overstated corporate consent and pres-
ence, have been sometimes abused. 175
Prior to the discovery of the inconvenient forum rationale American courts
had usually abjured discretion; if jurisdiction existed, the case would be
heard.176 Some common law doctrine,177 and occasional statute, 178 attempted
to limit place of trial to the old common law concept of venue-the place of
relevant events or applicable law. The interpretation of "transitory" to exclude
foreign trespass, so often the procedure for determining title, is also an example.
The oft-repeated statement that a court could exercise no jurisdiction over
foreign land without offense to sovereignty is nonsense; equity did so all the
time for no better reason than that equity acts in personam.1 79 Of course such
decrees do not affect title to foreign land if the situs refuses to recognize
them.' 80 But, assuming the adjudicating court has taken account of the policy
of the situs and has been careful not to offend it, why should the courts of the
situs refuse effect? Res judicata is as valid here as elsewhere. Even if one
concedes that the situs is usually the most convenient forum, and the only one
which can "bind the world," it is not invariably so. And rights in real estate
may come up in non-title cases, as part of a property settlement, for example,
in divorce. The fact of the matter is that it is almost impossible to set up rigid
venue principles that will not occasionally work out badly. The Supreme Court
has refused the sanction of full faith and credit to attempts to limit adjudication
of statutory liability to the courts of the enacting state.' 8' It has also struck
down refusals to adjudicate causes arising out of foreign statutes even where
175. In a garnishment proceeding the exemption laws of the forum generally apply.
Chicago, Rock I. & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 717 (1899) ; 3 BEAE. § 600.2. The
employee of a corporation thus may get the benefit of only the lowest state statute. See
Moore & Olglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 VA. L. REv. 557,
587 (1943).
176. See Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1239-40 (1930).
177. E.g., Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236 Mass. 185,
128 N.E. 4 (1920) (expanding the usual definition of "local," as opposed to "transitory,"
to avoid hearing litigation difficult to try except where facts occurred). Cf. Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (the "internal affairs" rule precluding stock-
holders' suits against foreign corporations).
178. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Coap. LAw § 225; OHro REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.37 (Page 1953);
S.C. CoDE § 826 (1952). But see First Nat'l Bank v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396
(1952) (holding Illinois statute refusing to hear wrongful death actions that could be
heard at the locus, without explicit consideration of convenience, unconstitutional).
179. Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810).
180. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909). The constitutional problem is exhaustively
analyzed and discussed in Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U.
Cm. L. REv. 620 (1954).
181. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914) ; Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909).
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limited carefully to situations where the forum prescribed had jurisdiction to
decide effectively and was willing to do so.
1 8 2
Efforts to expand effective judicial jurisdiction beyond local power even
where local law is applicable are unlikely to be recognized and enforced abroad
save among sister states. It is one thing to give effect to such judgments with-
in a federal nation of limited size with a Court available to arbitrate excessive
and conflicting claims in terms of due process, interstate relations and the na-
tional interest. It is quite another in the international community where sub-
stantive standards are more variant and conflicting national interests more
difficult to submerge in a concept of common welfare. But even here the pro-
tection cast over local citizens as defendants has diminished as power has fact-
ually become more diverse. Particularly in the important area of business
regulation it is virtually impossible to insulate local interests from foreign law.
Even individuals, in an era of rapid transportation and dispersion of wealth,
are likely to find themselves potentially subject to the physical power of several
states. The underlying factual probabilities are very different today than even
fifty years ago, when the common assumption of suit at defendant's domicil
affected theories aimed at expanding recognition of foreign "rights." Now it is
as least as likely that the shoe is on the other foot, and it is the defendant who
seeks immunity by claiming a right based on foreign law.
The Technical Nature of Criminal Law
As issues cease to be framed in terms of private rights conceptually untouched
by conscious social policy, differences of sovereign prescriptions become more
sharply defined and tensions correspondingly mount. Where explicit mandates
of a sovereign closely touching its public order are involved, the political element
in the international decision-making process is correspondingly heightened and
intensified. The same fundamental considerations are present, but courts, under-
standably concerned about political involvement and the proper limits of judi-
cial discretion, have resorted to a "territorial" concept of law which obscures
the underlying principles and policies.
Punishment for criminal acts has never been considered by either common or
civil law as "transitory" or "extra-territorial."' 8 3 Each state punishes only acts
criminal by its own law; there is never any choice of law problem as such-
though it is entirely possible for the same acts to constitute a crime by the law
of more than a single state. 8 4 Territoriality enters the legislative picture be-
182. First Nat'l Bank v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952) ; cf. Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) (Wisconsin exclusionary statute not limited to cases where
service at place of tort was possible).
183. E.g., 2 MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTMNATIONAL LAW 236 (1906) ("no principle
better settled than that the penal laws of a country have no extraterritorial force.");
Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Jurisdic-
tion with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 436, 469 (Supp. 1935) (hereinafter cited
as Harvard Research on Jurisdiction).
184. "[It is quite impracticable under present conditions to establish in all cases a
simple jurisdiction .. " Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 603.
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cause local statutes have generally been drafted, or interpreted, to cover only
offenses occurring within territorial limits; that is, where at least some of the
acts constituting the crime, or closely related to it, took place within the geo-
graphical boundaries of the sovereign. 85 At common law venue was laid at
the "place" of the crime, and, as in private law matters, venue merged into
jurisdiction and joined forces with sovereignty. In civilian nations laws relat-
ing to the ordre public were from the outset classified as "territorial," and thus
not entitled to extra-territorial enforcement by other states. Since crimes in
both systems were considered offenses against the sovereign, there was a con-
ceptual barrier to considering a murder, for example, in State A an offense
against State B. This idea was inverted and given positive expression by say-
ing that because each state was sovereign within its territory, no other state
could punish conduct occurring there without derogating from, and thereby
offending, the sovereignty of the territorial state.186 The time-honored excep-
tion, and transparent theoretical inconsistency, is the competency of a state to
punish its own nationals for acts committed abroad. This latter "jurisdiction"
is widely regarded as subsidiary to that of the lex loci,1 87 though some consider
it concurrent, and a few, if one may judge from their refusal to extradite na-
tionals without any obligation to prosecute locally (though claiming nonetheless
the right to try foreigners for crimes committed in their territory), still pursue
a policy of catch-as-catch-can'18s
Obviously, as in the case of conflicts doctrine, the key to territoriality lies in
defining the connecting link. Since the purpose of criminal prosecution is
principally protective, and since states have been almost unbelievably provincial
and backward with regard to international assistance in criminal prosecution, 8 9
there has been a good deal of cheating around the edges in terms of extending
one's own competency in order to meet the problems of rapid communication,
185. Id. at 480-84.
186. E.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). See
Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 193, 198 (1932);
Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes 11, 16 J. Camn. L. & CRim. 495, 509-10 (1925). The
classic discussion of territoriality is contained in the several views of the evenly divided
court in The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10/9 (1927) (e.g., at 56, Lord
Finlay's oft-quoted, "A country is no more entitled to assume jurisdiction over foreigners
than it would be to annex a bit of territory. .. ").
187. See Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 531. The conclusion there is based on
the extent to which the nationality principle is circumscribed with safeguards; e.g., also
punishable by lex loci delicti. Some states assimilate domiciliaries to nationals. Id. at 533.
183. See Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law
School, Extradition, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 15, 238 (Supp. 1935) (hereinafter cited as
Harvard Research on Extradition). A greater number of states exhibit an unwillingness
to extradite nationals but concede a duty to prosecute locally. Id. at 236.
189. It was not until the last half of the nineteenth century that extradition treaties
became at all widespread. Id. at 41-42. No comprehensive steps were taken to secure in-
vestigation and judicial assistance until recently. See Jones, International Judicial Assist-
ance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 530-31, 540-43
(1953).
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transportation and resultant interdependency. The fetish for a territorial link,
coupled with common law and constitutional venue and jury requirements, has
led to attempts to maintain the fiction that each state punishes only crimes com-
mitted locally. Statutes have, however, provided for local punishment if any of
the acts or omissions connected with the crime, although not in themselves doc-
trinally significant, have been committed locally.10 This has been bolstered by
other statutes redefining "crimes" and creating new ones to provide a geo-
graphical point of reference, however slight, within the boundaries.'' Con-
spiracy and attempt doctrine and principal-accessory concepts have also been
used to reach far abroad.192 Only occasionally has ingenuity failed when there
was pressure to find a territorial act, and in these cases, counterfeiting and
offenses against state security, the protective principle has been frankly
espoused. 1 93 Some maintain that a state has competency to try anyone for an
offense against its nationals (or their property) under its own law, even though
they were located outside the state at the time of the crime.0 4 This view, how-
ever, has been severely criticized as too extreme. 195 The usual argument is
premised on the assumption that the acts were not criminal where committed.
It could also be argued that it may put too heavy a burden on the defendant
in terms of producing witnesses.
The result of these expansions of jurisdiction through redefinition of both
crime and its locus has been to make more than one law applicable to many
offenses, a situation clearly in conflict with the theories of exclusive territorial
sovereignty and equally at odds with the fallacy that one law must govern all
legal relationships. Criminal statutes have not attempted to disguise the tenuous
connection with territoriality. Virtually any act or omission within a state is
sufficient if there is an intent to commit a crime somewhere :;91 the converse
of this is "objective territoriality," which admits the competence of a state to
190. Authorities are collected and analyzed in Harvard Research on Jurisdiction
488-508; Berge, Criminal, Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MicHi. L. REV.
238 (1931). The Harvard Draft Convention adopts the "in whole or in part" terminology
of many statutes, and expressly rejects the view that the territorial acts must in them-
selves be crimes or attempts. Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 480, 499.
191. Id. at 491, 494; Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts
Committed by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L. REv. 303, 316-21 (1934).
192. See Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 503-08.
193. Id. at 543-63. It is suggested there that the justification lies in the failure of
the territorial sovereign to enact laws protecting foreign states as well as itself. Id. at 552.
194. Known as the "passive personality" theory, asserted in some form by several
states, but rejected by the Harvard Draft Convention. Id. at 445.
195. The only causes cdlabres of modern times, the Lotus and Cutting cases, involved,
respectively, Turkish and Mexican statutes drafted in "passive personality" language.
In neither did prosecution or the particular facts require such broad language. Judge
Moore was a particularly severe critic of the theory, dissenting from the court's opinion
in Lotus and protesting Cutting's prosecution by Mexico, solely because of the language
of the statute. See The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10/9, at 89-93
(1927); MOORE, REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME AND THE CUTTNG CASE 34 (1887).
196. Called "subjective territoriality." See Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 484-94.
1142 [Vol. 65:1087
CONFLICTS ON AN UNRULY HORSE
punish a person who, though all his acts are outside the territorial limits, "will-
fully puts in motion a force to take effect in it."' 9 7 The latter is distinguishable
from an unqualified protective approach and also from the so-called "passive
personality" theory, which would by local criteria of crime and local trial pro-
tect nationals abroad, but it is nonetheless a formula capable of considerable
expansion. 1 8 Lack of clarity, I would suggest, is inevitable so long as the
theory is phrased in terms which, though strained, seek to give it a territorial
flavor by using fictions that confuse physical acts within the state with the con-
sequences of the proscribed conduct; and which indiscriminately merge con-
siderations of venue, notice and legislative policy.
One may concede without argument that the limits of power are territorial,
with only narrow exceptions, at the level of administration. Effective prevention
of and punishment for crime depends upon being able to lay hands on the
alleged culprit. There is, too, general agreement that a state is primarily in-
terested in the punishment of acts or omissions which directly affect its own
safety, that of persons and property within its boundaries, or that of its citizens,
domiciliaries or residents. One could, however, reasonably maintain that there
is a common interest in punishing "crime" irrespective of where it takes place,
at least to the extent that there is agreement on what acts are "criminal," what
is reasonable punishment and what constitutes fair procedure.199 The policy
that crimes committed in one state are of no concern to others is a short-sighted
and self-defeating one that, absent treaty, results only in harboring and protect-
ing criminals. Fortunately the pressure of mutual interest led to extradition
provisions in the Constitution (significantly, in the same article which provides
for full faith and credit) and to a rash of extradition treaties after 1850. Some
provincialism remains with regard to extradition of nationals, but by and large
states are now willing, on a reciprocal basis, to use their power in aid of a for-
eign state when the acts would be regarded as criminal by substantive domestic
standards.2 0°
Acts Generally Regarded as "Criminal"
A "universalist" view with regard to acts or omissions generally regarded as
criminal would permit prosecution wherever the offender could be brought
into custody. The failure to take this position can be rationally explained and
197. MOORE, op. cit. supra note 195, at 23. This principle was applied by the (evenly
divided) court in the Lotus case. See note 195 supra. Nothing could make more clear the
futility of a logical approach than a reading of the variant opinions in that case. See Cook,
The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Committed by foreigners
Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L. Rav. 303, 323-26 (1934).
198. It becomes virtually indistinguishable from the protective principle in its "extreme
applications." Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 494.
199. Usually labeled the "universalist" or "cosmopolitan" theory. See Levitt, Juris-
diction over Crimes, 16 J. CIu. L. & CRI. 316, 495 (1925).
200. See Harvard Research on Extradition 80-86. The Draft Convention adopts the
principle of "double criminality." Id. art. 2. Bilateral extradition treaties either adopt this
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supported by the difficulties of procuring and presenting evidence at a distance
from the place of the alleged acts, and by the consequent unfairness to the
defendant. The refusal to extradite absent reciprocal treaty obligations is more
difficult to justify, but can be explained partially by the protection customarily
thrown around the use of public power in criminal cases and the judicial re-
quirement for explicit authority to deprive an individual of freedom. The al-
most entirely accepted practice of not extraditing for acts not locally considered
crimes is similarly explicable. In addition, it is probably desirable to reserve
judgment with regard to alleged crimes which might conceivably offend one's
sense of justice.
Insofar as extradition treaties and practices exhibit a general willingness to
use local power in aid of prosecuting common crimes one could say with some
accuracy that, given substantive limits, the problem is simply one of venue.
The common interest in criminal prosecution has to this extent superseded
jealousies founded on sovereignty and the irrational position that crimes com-
mitted in one state are of no concern to others. So viewed criminal prosecu-
tion shows similarity to conflicts doctrine with the difference that selecting a
fair and convenient forum is particularly important. The failure to extend
extradition the full length of a foreign state's claims is not unlike the sometime
refusal to apply foreign law in private controversies, and is similarly based on
the public policy of the forum. In criminal matters, however, the public policy
is placed beyond the power of the judiciary to determine, and extradition
treaties, consistently with customary principles of specificity, set quite narrow
limits upon judicial discretion.
The continual reaching out, or "self-help," in criminal jurisdiction results
partly from the failure to devise efficient methods of administrative assistance
across international boundaries in terms of both prosecution and investigation,
partly from the desire to extend one's policy as far as possible. To the extent
that the conduct itself is commonly considered criminal, jurisdiction amounts
to no more than broadened venue and is objectionable only insofar as it might,
on particular facts, put an unfair burden on defendant in terms of securing
evidence, or possibly, be a less efficient place to prosecute for the same reason.
By thus allocating responsibility on a multi-state basis when the criminal con-
duct has more than local contacts, the general level of law enforcement is up-
graded and, one might hope, the groundwork laid for future administrative
cooperation. Since each state has by its own "law" an interest in prosecution,
exchange of evidence and cooperative investigation is encouraged. The criminal,
wherever prosecuted, is protected by the almost universal acceptance of double-
jeopardy, or non bis in idern,2°1 doctrine. It is worth noting that there is no
insistence that one "law" govern criminal conduct, and, for extradition pur-
principle or list extraditable offenses, in which case they will be qualified by a double
criminality approach. See examples contained in id. app. III and V.
201. See Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 602-16. The Roman doctrine is somewhat
broader than that incorporated in the Fifth Amendment.
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poses, variations in details of punishment prescribed or of conduct considered
criminal are unimportant if substantial equivalency exists. 20 2
Conduct Not Generally Regarded as "Criminal"
Where the conduct is not universally proscribed different policies are present.
One policy involves the fairness of subjecting defendant to punishment in
accordance with prescriptions not within his reasonable foresight at the time
of acting. While mens rea is not a necessary ingredient of "crime," there is a
widely shared belief that in its absence there ought to be quite clear notice that
the activity in question is prohibited-the clarity of the notice varying directly
with accepted ideas of individual morality and the harshness of the punishment.
Here "territoriality" may.serve a real and useful function since physical contact
with a foreign state constitutes some notice of its laws and customs to the ex-
tent, at least, of putting one on inquiry. An individual traveling abroad is
conscious of an obligation to obey local laws, and generally knows that they
may differ somewhat from those to which he is accustomed. A business enter-
prise is perhaps even more aware of potential prescriptions with regard to
"business done" in a foreign country, at least where it is more than incidental
and isolated. Particularly is this true where the conduct proscribed is regulated
not by a single state but by many, though perhaps not by all, thereby increas-
ing general awareness of areas of potentially prohibited acts. It is, for example,
common knowledge that the sale of securities or insurance, the practice of cer-
tain professions, compliance with pure food and drug laws, or the number of
wives one may have at the same time, are often subject to criminal sanctions.
How much territorial contact is necessary to put one on notice depends on the
nature of the act and the notoriety of the proscription. Where the "impact"
within a foreign state is reasonably foreseeable and the matter is one that is
often subject to criminal sanction, even though not so regulated at the place of
acting, it may be sufficient to subject the actor to the legal process of the place
of impact if he can be there taken into custody, without objection by other
states.2 3 The case is, of course, even stronger where the particular actor in-
tends to violate the law in question, for here the general interest in order and
respect for law is put in issue. Some physical act within the territory has no
202. The crime may be differently denominated as long as the contact would be
criminal by both laws, and punishment beyond a set minimum at approximately a felony
level (one or two years) would be common to both laws. There is some precedent in
England and the United States contra where the treaty contains named crimes. See
Harvard Research on Extradition 81-86.
203. Distinguished jurists have attempted to limit "objective territoriality" by re-
quiring some close connection between acts and effect, or impact. See, e.g., MooRE,
op. cit. supra note 195, at 34 (acts must be "brought, either by an immediate effect or by
direct and continuous causal relationship, within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.") ;
M. Loder in The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.IJ., Ser. A, No. 10/9, at 34 (1927)
(dissenting opinion) (justifiable only "where the act and its effect are indistinguishable").
In addition to the semantic and practical difficulties of such a test, I believe it does not
reflect the valid policy suggested in the text, while the cases themselves may have it in mind.
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magic in itself. The real issue is due process-the fairness of subjecting the
offender to rules that were unfamiliar to him, and the fairness, perhaps, of the
foreign state as the place of trial.
The second major policy consideration where the crime is not one commonly
recognized as such concerns the quality of the prohibition and punishment.
Criminal behavior goes to the very roots of social organization, and, because
individual freedom is often in issue, the limits of tolerance are narrower than
in other fields of law. In many countries certain activities are highly favored
and any public encroachment by way of limitation is viewed with jaundiced eye.
Take, for example, freedom of speech and press. A foreign law with regard to
criminal libel which attempts to touch newspapers and radio broadcasts "pub-
lished" elsewhere is likely to be claimed a violation of "territorial sovereign-
ty."'20 4 In these and similar cases where a conflict of policy exists, there is
much more at stake than mere venue. Some effort to assign competence on a
territorial basis may be useful, but only if it helps to prevent sharp conflicts.
Resolution at a substantive level is preferable. It is, for the same basic reason,
usually urged that one state should not punish for acts committed outside its
territorial limits when the acts are, in some positive sense, required or, more
doubtfully, privileged ;2o3 conversely, courts have been reluctant to order a de-
fendant in a civil case to do some act abroad which is or may be in contraven-
tion of the law of the sovereign in whose territory he must perform.200 In part
this self-denial relates again to ideas of fairness (damned if you do and damned
if you don't), but it also reflects a conscious self-restraint by the judiciary where
other states have different views strongly held and potential power to enforce.
As the quality of the foreign prescription increases in its offensive aspects
any ideas of "territoriality" are cast aside, and political protest goes directly to
the nature of the prescription rather than its place of occurrence. This is so
particularly if one's own nationals are involved, but today even with regard to
foreign nationals, alleged "denials of justice" are likely to be subject to diplo-
matic protest.2 7 There is a gradation of policy differences, and territorial com-
204. The fact that the Cutting case, MOORE, op. cit. supra note 195, was so vigorously
protested by the United States is, I think partially if not wholly, explicable in terms of
the freedom of press. Cutting was prosecuted and imprisoned for publishing in the
United States (and in Mexico) a newspaper account libeling a Mexican.
205. See Harvard Research on Jurisdiction 616-17. The scope of privilege is hard
to pin down; in a sense whatever is not required or forbidden can be said to be "privileged."
It should be analogized to "required" in the context here used. See id. at 466-68.
206. RESTATEMENT § 94; Dicay, CONFLIcr OF LAws 637 (6th ed., Morris 1949). So
strong is the idea of territorial jurisdiction that there is a general reluctance to order
acts done in another state, although there is considerable precedent for such a decree. See
GooDRaIcH 219-22.
207. The distinction between protesting treatment of nationals and treatment of others,
particularly nationals of the offending state, is based on a policy of caution in setting prece-
dent that may operate to limit one's own sovereignty and that may jeopardize other political
objectives; a sense of one's limited power in the world community and a desire to hold
one's fire for matters of more direct concern; and a theory of international law, reflecting
these policies, which views it as governing only inter-sovereign relations and not indi-
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petence serves as a sort of intermediate position. Given a sharp conflict not
going to basic issues of human rights, territoriality is employed as a rationale
for claiming and recognizing dominant interests on the part of one state. Dif-
ferences are tolerated and resolution in fact depends upon the ability of the
prosecuting state to enforce its prescriptions. Admittedly there is nothing very
satisfying in thus leaving matters to chance, but surely we can accept the im-
perfections of political institutions in the world community without perpetuat-
ing confusion between the territorial organization of law enforcement and the
policy aims of legal doctrine.
Territorial Power and Public Policy: Political Questions
Where the territorial interpretation of legislation goes beyond fairness in
terms of notice and venue to an attempted allocation of sovereign competency
to determine substantive policy, we move from judicial to predominantly poli-
tical norms, with all the limitations on the judicial function that necessarily
follow. Particularly perplexing are extensions of police power resulting in
economic regulation of business and trade or the seizure of property. Domesti-
cally policies dictating such action are arrived at through legislation, and courts
have retreated to a test of factual reasonableness that rarely leads to constitu-
tional veto. If it can be shown that the regulation bears a factual relationship
to health or welfare and is equitably administered, it likely will run judicial
fire. Presumably the same constitutional tests and the same interpretative
criteria govern business done internationally or owned or conducted by for-
eigners. But the national interest is here more obscure, for what benefits the
citizens of one state may do so at the expense of others. Extra-territorial
application of our antitrust laws, the administration of exchange controls and
nationalization of industries are among the more important current problems.
Where what is sauce for the goose is something else for the gander, power to
enforce locally through unilateral determination of appropriate policy is un-
likely to prove a mutually satisfactory solution.
Antitrust Prosecutions
There is little difficulty in fitting past antitrust prosecutions concerned with
international trade into criteria of substantive and procedural due process. For-
eign officials as well as foreign businessmen may have little sympathy with
vidual rights. Under this theory the sovereign must establish its "interest" in order to
have, so to speak, procedural standing. The inadequacies of these policies and this theory
have been demonstrated by many. See, especially, MfcDougal & Leighton, The Rights
of Man it the World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 59
YALE L.J. 60 (1949). The notion that sovereigns should not intervene in the "internal
affairs" of other states is another facet of the idea of territorial sovereignty. But it
scarcely requires documentation that in an interdependent world the scope of external
affairs is ever smaller, and that deprivations of fundamental human rights, particularly
where quantitatively significant, cannot-as the General Assembly has increasingly recog-
nized-be ignored.
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Sherman Act philosophy and even less understanding of its method and scope,
but I cannot believe that those subject to prosecution have not been instructed
by counsel as to the potential hazards they run.20 8 Their complaint is not based
on their own lack of knowledge, but rather on the lack of respect shown for the
foreign laws or practices they raise in defense. Only where it is impossible for
them to produce evidence in their behalf, or to comply with a decree, without
being prosecuted elsewhere, do they present a convincing case. 209 For whatever
relevance it may have, prosecutions to date, with the possible exception of
Alcoa 2 10 and ICI,2 1 1 have fitted comfortably enough within existing jurisdic-
tional doctrine.212 More important, the practices proscribed have had an actual
or potential impact on the trade and commerce of the United States sufficient
to legitimize some measure of governmental control. The difficulty is that they
have had, too, an important impact on the economies of other nations, which
understandably resented unilateral action by us. Oddly enough, Alcoa, the
most difficult case to bring within jurisdictional doctrine, had the least sub-
stantive effect outside the United States. ICI, on the other hand, was widely
regarded by the United Kingdom press as an attempt to foist American nylons
on a hardpressed and dollar-poor economy.21 3 And there is increasing evidence
208. E.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949).
In its able opinion the court pointed out that the Dutch defendant, Phillips, had know-
ingly participated in a scheme enabling General Electric to dominate the United States
markets with actual knowledge of the antitrust laws.
209. In the General Electric prosecution, see note 208 supra, Phillips was excused
from producing records other than those located in the United States for fear of
"international complications." United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 851-52,
878 (D.N.J. 1953). United States' attempts to investigate alleged conspiracies have been
thwarted by direct prohibitions of foreign governments against their domestic corporations
producing documents in response to United States subpoenas. See, for example, the
prohibitions issued by the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, India and Palestine in
the 1952 oil investigation. Transcript of Record, pp. 509, 570, 595-667, 730-33, In re
Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production, Transportation,
Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
210. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
211. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
212. Even critics concede as much. See Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954) (claiming the objective terri-
toriality, or impact, theory of Alcoa and ICI a violation of international law).
213. The district court decree required du Pont and ICI to grant for reasonable royal-
ties nonexclusive immunity under foreign licenses to applicants to import into any foreign
country any common chemical product lawfully manufactured in the United States.
The effect was to destroy the exclusive territorial monoply of BNS in the United King-
dom and allow United States exports to compete with local British production. British
patent law views the licensing required by the American decree as an abuse of the patent
since it tends to allow imports to compete with domestic production. See Note, 66 HARv.
L. REv. 925, 926 (1953). Great Britain could, of course, have set up effective exchange
regulations or tariff barriers to American imports, which would have had an identical
restraining effect on United States commerce. This consideration obviously influenced
the Court of Appeal. British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.,
[1953] 1 Ch. 19, 25 (C.A. 1952).
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that our efforts at Sherman Act enforcement are regarded by others as an un-
warranted interference in their internal affairs.2 14 Market division and price
fixing may be offensive to widely held (though less widely than before) ideas
of economic liberalism, but so too are tariffs, subsidies, currency controls and
quotas. Gross exploitation of domestic consumers and competitors by domestic
or foreign businessmen may violate trade conspiracy doctrine in many coun-
tries, but such laws are not interpreted and enforced with anything approach-
ing the vigor of the Sherman Act.215 And exploitation of foreign markets has
almost never been viewed as harmful to domestic interests. In an era of eco-
nomic nationalism and struggle for foreign markets most states have attempted
to carry water on both shoulders, seeking to promote national industry at home
and abroad without regard to foreign interests or the needs of other countries.
Whether or not the United States could fairly be accused of extending its
domestic policies beyond legitimate domestic interests, it appears to formulate
its decisions without explicit consideration of the legitimate interests, and some-
what antagonistic views, of others. Extension of anti-cartel policy to world
trade is clearly an objective of American foreign policy that is shared, if at all,
with only moderate enthusiasm and considerable qualification by most foreign
governments. The gap is sufficient to be called a genuine conflict of policy, in
method and degree if not always in ultimate objectives. Against the presumed
benefit to consumers of competitive pricing and quality, and the protection
ostensibly offered economically weaker competitors from "unfair" practices,
some nations weigh with skepticism the adjustments of their economies to the
full force of competition in terms of the capacity to survive in the world market,
the impact upon balance of payments, domestic price structure, and ultimately
local employment and national self-sufficiency.216 Even those who accept liberal-
ism at home are less confident of its desirability where the competition is foreign.
Then, too, there are political difficulties in imposing peculiarly American prac-
214. The ICI decree was colorfully labeled "judicial aggression" by a Canadian
newspaper. See Timberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, 11 TEM
RECORD OF Ass'N OF BAR OF N.Y. 101, 110 (1956) ; Whitney, Anti-Trust Law and Foreign
Commerce, 11 id. 134, 135. Government comment has been somewhat more temperate.
See, for example, the statement of the Conservative Government to the House of Commons
with regard to the subpoena duces tecum served on Anglo-Iranian by the Justice Depart-
ment, reported in Comity and Oil Companies, 165 Tim ECONOMIST 556 (1952) (incon-
sistent with international comity).
215. Laws are collected and discussed in U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OFF.
IREc. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 11 A, B (Doc. No. E/2379 and E/2379/Adds. 1 and 2)(1953); DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT TO THE SUB-COMMIITTEE ON MONOPOLY OF THE
SELECT COMITTEE ON SMALL BLSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FOREIGN LEGis-
LATION CONCERNING MONOPOLY AND CARTEL PRACTICES (1952) ; Wengler, Laws Concern-
ing Unfair Competition and the Conflict of Laws, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 167 (1955).
216. "Cartel controls are supplements or substitutes for the State's control of trade
by tariffs, export and import licenses, trade agreements, anti-dumping laws, and the ration-
ing of foreign exchange." Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of International
Cartels, A Study made for the Subcommittee on War Mobilization of the Committee on
Military Affairs, S. Monograph No. 1, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1944).
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tice and standards-not because the standards are demonstrably unsound or
inapplicable to foreign economies (though this is possible) ,217 but because they
are a departure from more common norms of law and administration and are
new to foreign businessmen and officials.2 18 Conduct we proscribe is elsewhere
tolerated and even positively approved. Methods we employ to determine vio-
lations are elsewhere regarded as the grossest violations of privacy.219 In-
evitably a good measure of what anyone puts into "justice" consists of experi-
ence, familiarity and expectation.
It is self-evident that anything that affects the external trade and commerce
of the United States also affects the trade and commerce of other nations, and
may have far greater consequences for others than for the United States.
Arguably the United States is most interested in those practices which, as in
Alcoa,220 affect domestic markets, and somewhat less concerned about the con-
duct of American firms engaged in export or production abroad, neo-mercan-
tilists to the contrary notwithstanding. But even this proposition accepted-
and its premise is highly dubious in view of the complex, worldwide industries
commonplace today-it would amount to saying that those practices that most
concern us are likely to be those most difficult to investigate and control. The
physical power of the United States and common jurisdictional doctrine have
no relationship to the international trusts most urgently, from our value per-
spective, in need of busting. Even as matters now stand there is little hope
for an effective implementation of Sherman Act philosophy without foreign
assistance in investigation and enforcement.
2 2 1
In point of fact United States antitrust policy goes beyond any demonstrable
impact on American markets. It is a policy that the government has vigorously
recommended through political channels to the international community.2 - It
is our contention that it is essential to achievement of the common objective of
increased productivity on a worldwide scale. Thus our political target is an
international antitrust agreement reasonably close to the Sherman Act in func-
tion and effect. Apparently it is the theory of the executive branch that prose-
cution to virtually the full extent of local power will create pressures for favor-
able compromise. To do so involves, of course, a risk to other foreign policy
objectives. The theory may be unwise, but it is scarcely illegal. The question
217. See Wengler, supra note 215, at 188. A good deal of European opinion holds
that the large population and area of the United States make possible a competition between
American firms, whereas the problem for Europe would be urging competition at home
between a domestic and foreign producer.
218. See Haight, supra note 212, at 644-51.
219. See, e.g., Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Swiss
federal attorney seized documents subpoenaed by district court on ground their produc-
tion would constitute criminal economic espionage under Swiss law). Cf. note 209 supra.
220. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
221. See REPORT OF THE ATr'Y GENERAL'S NATIONAL ComifTTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 98, 100 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Arr'v GEN.'S REPORT).
222. See id. at 101-08 (summarizing our post-war efforts through United Nations
channels) ; DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT, supra note 215, at 178.
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of whether or not it is politic is one that should be left to the political depart-
ments of government.223
If my analysis of precedent is correct, territoriality is a synonym for reason-
able notice, venue and legitimate sovereign concern. There is no very useful
purpose in cataloguing physical acts within the United States, or using verbal
formulae such as the locus of the conspiracy, the requirement of a local act, and
so forth, save as they have some factual relevance to the notice question. It is
of far greater importance that defendant did in fact affect the "trade and com-
merce of the United States" directly and materially under circumstances that
should create an awareness of American prescriptions. 224 Actually, in the anti-
trust context, the argument premised on lack of knowledge of American anti-
trust laws is virtually a caricature of reality. The problem more likely is that
knowing of the Sherman Act offenders carefully stay beyond the limits of our
effective process.225
How direct and material the impact must be on American trade and com-
merce is more difficult. There is precedent for a thin reading of that phrase in
an analogous statute where there was an evident attempt to evade American
law.22 6 Presumably the impact should be sufficiently substantial to legitimize
unilateral American conduct. Arguably it should have a somewhat more solid
factual content where a predominantly foreign-owned corporation is involved
than where local enterprises seek cover in foreign law. But, save possibly on
the notice issue, it is difficult to see why. Once a business, domestic or foreign,
has reason to know that its conduct is or may be reprehended by American
law, the problem is simply one of apprehension.227 The judicial function stops
once it is established that standards of individual justice, or due process, have
been met.
Absent clear political guidance courts might well essay a more moderate,
hence diplomatic, approach. But in Timken 228 the majority wisely rejected a
223. Prosecutions have State Department sanction. See ATr'y GEN.'s REPORT 94.
224. See Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 569, 582 (1954);
cf. Haight, supra note 212, at 648-49.
225. E.g., the diamond cartel. See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1404, 1411-14 (1947).
226. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
227. The Attorney General's Committee recommends a double standard. Where Ameri-
cans are involved it would require "such substantial anticompetitive effects . . . as to
constitute unreasonable restraints"; where foreigners alone are involved, restraints "only
where they are intended to, and actually do, result in substantial anticompetitive effects."
A'rr'y GEN.'s REPoRT 76. This goes further in terms of "notice" than I think necessary.
But the Committee makes this allocation not expressly for reasons of due process, but
rather "international complications." Ibid.
228. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951). See
also United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
The issue was not jurisdictional in the narrow sense of effective control over the domestic
corporations and foreign subsidiaries involved, but did involve interpretation of the scope
of the Sherman Act to foreign activities. Defendants in both cases raised a question as
to the legitimacy of their acts in view of the difficult conditions of international trade
in an era of governmental regulation of exchange, imports and exports, and analogous
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"rule of reason" which, in the context of contemporary international business,
might have encouraged resort to the protection of foreign legislation. Conceiv-
ably, despite the difficulties of formulating economic criteria translatable into
legal norms, a balancing of sovereign interests would be sound American policy.
Perhaps we should be circumspect in prosecuting restraints that, if removed,
would open up a foreign market to American exports when it is already hard-
pressed for dollar exchange.229 Arguably, too, our standards are such as to
make more difficult the carrying out of other equally important aspects of
our foreign economic policy; for example, encouraging American investment
abroad.230 But such questions are not properly within the judicial function and
are well beyond even the advanced fact-finding process of judicial adminis-
tration of the antitrust laws. An approach that attempted to determine case
by case what was "reasonable" conduct in view of foreign laws and the facts
of cartelization in the world economy would seriously weaken our political
hand without adding certainty or predictability to the Sherman Act's operative
scope.
2 31
Foreign Acts of State: More Political Questions
We have already noted that judicial self-restraint is most rigorously observed
when courts are called upon to "reverse" an executed judgment or other official
act of another state.23 2 Several policies underlie this practice. In a legal system
restrictions, and sought a finding that the restraints were, as a consequence, "reasonable."
See Avr'y GEN.'S REPORT 77-83; Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REv.
569, 591, 713, 717-23 (1954) ; Carlston, Foreign Economic Policy and the Antitrust Laws,
40 MINN. L. REv. 125, 139-41 (1956).
229. See notes 213 and 214 supra. But these are political questions. The prosecution
of foreign corporations and the recommendations of the government as to an appropriate
decree are matters coordinated by Justice with State. See ATr'Y GEN.'S REPORT 94. If
those charged with diplomacy are unconcerned about the political repercussions it is
difficult to see any need for judicial caution.
230. Timken has caused real concern. See ATr'y GEN.'s REPORT 92-98; Burns, Report
on Foreign Trade Conferences Abroad, 1 ANTITUST BULL. 303 (1955); Kalijarvi,
Relation of Antitrust Policies to Foreign Trade and Investment, 33 Dzp'T STATE BULL.
538, 540-41 (1955). On the other hand, cutting off the flow of direct investment dollars
might encourage foreign countries to change their laws to permit United States partici-
pation on a competitive basis without resort to market division and other proscribed re-
straints.
231. I would concede that there may be circumstances where a company is so eco-
nomically squeezed by conflicting national policies that there may be no practical alternative
which does not violate the law of one of the countries involved. But to retract all the way
to a "rule of reason" for territorial division of markets, price-fixing, and other of the more
heinous "per se" offenses seems to open wide the gates.
232. The leading case with regard to foreign "Acts of State" is Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897) ("[T]he acts of the defendant were the acts of the government
of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of
another government."). The suit was in tort for acts of an army officer acting in his
official capacity, and, on its facts, could be viewed as merely one familiar aspect of sovereign
immunity. But Act of State is broader than sovereign immunity. First, it protects those
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composed of multiple decision makers of equal formal authority tolerance is an
essential ingredient. So long as litigants of all nationalities must depend on
national courts to adjudicate controversies involving international facts and
national policies there is a common interest in formulating acceptable standards
of res judicata. These standards ought to and do extend beyond executed judg-
ments or decrees, but they would rarely fall short of this minimum. The objec-
tive of stabilizing human relationships argues as persuasively internationally as
locally for an end to controversy. Concern for the individual makes it imperative
that the risk of conflicting prescriptions be minimized. Thus unfairness to
litigants or to others relying on the international integrity of sovereign decisions
and the doubt that would reciprocally be cast upon one's own territorial acts
are convincing arguments for self-restraint.
In addition, and of equal stature, are the political questions raised. When
sovereign power exercised within one's own territory is brought into question
elsewhere, sensibilities are offended. The power value is at stake for the na-
tional community concerned, and, in terms of precedent, for those who question
it as well. To undo what another state has officially done obviously involves
inter-sovereign relationships, and can be justified-if at all--only where funda-
mental standards of substantive or procedural due process have been violated.
Absent diplomatic guidance, there is a real question of judicial competency.
In domestic cases the Constitution as read by the Court sets enforceable limits
to state abuse of power and to political differences. Internationally, restraints,
where not self-imposed, are the product of diplomatic pressure. Hence diplo-
mats play a role for which there is no valid domestic analogy in determining
the political wisdom of exercising jurisdiction to "reverse." Before a court
may intelligently inquire into the merits of a claim it needs to consider the
larger consequences of "reversal." For these political questions it urgently
needs the informed views of the State Department.23 3
whose title to property rests on the territorial exercise of sovereign power by government
officials. E.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (both involving purchasers for value of property con-
fiscated in Mexico by revolutionaries during successful Carranza revolt). In the second
place, Act of State maintains that it cannot be wrongful under United States law to induce
a foreign government to take executive or legislative action. American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective
Council, Inc., 283 App. Div. 44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1st Dep't 1953).
English courts have approved Underhill and Oetien. Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929]
1 K.B. 718 (C.A.) ; Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.) (both cases involving
confiscation of Russian-owned property in Russia). Dicey-Morris limits Act of State to
sovereign immunity cases (the Underhill facts), classifies other cases under "political"
laws. He is critical of the protection accorded territorial confiscation. See Dicmy, CO NFLICT
OF LAws 152, 156-57 (6th ed., Morris 1949).
European courts apparently do not follow the Oetien view of Act of State, attributing
less significance to the distinction between territorial and extra-territorial acts. See Wortley,
Probl~mes Soulevs en Droit International Privi par la Ligislation sur L'Expropriation,
67 RECUEIL DES COURs 343, 378-421, 423-25 (1939) (a comparative analysis by the editor
of the relevant section of DIcEy).
233. See note 232 supra. The view taken in the text is consistent with that of the
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Unfortunately, a largely irrelevant separation of powers dogma has some-
what clogged channels of communication between courts and executive. When
this is the case or when the executive is embarrassed to express publicly its
view, the judiciary must seek, in the practices and known policies of the gov-
ernment, clues as to the political desirability of inquiry. It is through this door
that diplomatic practices of "recognition" have infiltrated legal doctrine--doc-
trine supplemented by the views of the court, overstated in Pink,234 that equate
public policy with foreign policy as determined (seinble) by the executive.
The marriage of "law" to foreign policy is today clumsily consummated by
recognition, de facto recognition and recognition of foreign acts of state.235
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandische-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). One aspect of Act of State is the
political one of whether or not it is wise to seek to right a wrong done by a foreign govern-
ment through judicial channels. Commentators who would ignore the political aspects
cannot see the relevance of executive policy, and confuse the merits with the political
question. E.g., Olmstead, International Law, 1954 Annual Survey of American Law, 30
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 12 (1955) ("it is regrettable that the executive must lead the courts by
the hand").
234. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The issue was the effect to be
given Russian decrees confiscating property situate in the United States. Under the Litvinov
Settlement the United States government agreed to abandon pursuing the claims of its
citizens as to property seized in Russia and to settle such claims from assets of Russians
in this country. The New York courts refused to turn over such property to the United
States, holding it for the original owners on the grounds that the Russian decrees violated
New York "public policy." The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the states
could have no public policy which contravened the foreign policy of the federal govern-
ment. But it was extremely difficult to support convincingly the view that another distri-
bution of the assets would affect our foreign policy (i.e., amicable relations with Russia),
when the only effect would be to distribute the assets to foreign refugees rather than to
use them as a fund for wronged Americans. See also Note, 48 CoLuI%. L. REv. 890 (1948).
235. The potential doctrinal significance of recognition lies in its conceptual con-
nection with such familiar references as "sovereign," "state," "official" or "law." There
is much debate as to whether it is "declaratory" or "constitutive"; i.e., whether or not
a foreign government exists in the forum if not recognized. See CHrN, THE INTMNA-
TIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 13-15 (1951); LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW c. 4 (1947). Practices can be more profitably described in terms of access to
arenas of formal authority. See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A
Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 193-98 (1953).
An unrecognized sovereign has no standing to sue in American courts. Russian Soc.
Fed. Soy. Rep. v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923) ; and see Guaranty Trust
Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938).
A de facto government is entitled to plead sovereign immunity. Wulfsohn v. Russian
Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep., 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923); The Arantzazu Mendi, [1939]
A.C. 256. And in all the decided cases the territorial acts of a de facto government have
been put into the Act of State category. E.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262
N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.).
While some inferences are normally permissible from nonrecognition, recognition
should not automatically validate legislation or decrees of a foreign state. The diplomatic
policies which lead to recognition may have little factual relevance to the foreign prescrip-
tion involved, and are not indicative of executive approval or disapproval of the foreign
legislation. The language of Belmont that the effect of recognition "was to validate, so
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Problems of actual or potential diplomatic proportions will occur more fre-
quently in domestic courts as the various sovereigns continue to take active
roles in promoting national economic and social policies. These problems are
by no means confined to territorial acts of foreign governments. What among
the United States are problems of "law" tend to take on a strong "political"
coloration when viewed in a context of divided power. For courts to seek
political guidance in the resolution of political problems would be to act intelli-
gently and rationally. But, understandably, they are inhibited by concepts and
theory borrowed from a domestic setting. Objectivity of judgment and judicial
independence are vital domestic principles that have a more limited scope in the
jungle of international affairs: the seizure and sale of Iranian oil by Mossa-
degh's government is distinguishable from Roe's conversion of Doe's cow; it
presents a different problem for the English judge at Aden 236 than for the
Italian judge in Rome.2 37 The English government had unequivocably ex-
pressed and widely circulated its views-what the court called its "public
policy"--with regard to the "illegality" of the Iranian nationalization decree;
as an incident of diplomatic pressure, it was clearly desirable from the govern-
ment's point of view to limit the salability of Iranian oil in the world market.
That the English court could have responsibly ignored this policy is incon-
ceivable. All that really remained for judicial determination was the potential
injustice to a good faith purchaser unaware of the English policy and of the
possibility that English power, or that of other states sympathetic to the Eng-
lish contention, would be used to vindicate it. The Italian judge, on the other
hand, had no such clear political guidance; the position of Italy, both with re-
gard to the governments involved and the substantive issue, was too equivocal
to warrant a similar decision.
far as this country is concerned, all acts of the Soviet government here involved from
the commencement of its existence" is certainly too broad. See United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). It would, as Stone's concurrence pointed out, make recognition
more conclusive than the domestic test of full faith and credit. Id. at 334-35; see also
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 248 (1942) (dissenting opinion). Recognition or
nonrecognition of particular foreign acts of state by the political branch is a better solution
and, since Pink, has occasionally been resorted to. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger
S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (State Department did not
recognize the legality of Soviet nationalization decree assuming power over Latvia; non-
recognition must be given effect by courts); Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handel-
mattschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942) (expropriation of private Dutch assets
abroad by Netherlands government in exile approved by State Department, given effect
as to New York assets after characterization as "conservatory").
236. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246 (Aden). The de-
cision rested on the two grounds of a seizure which violated international law (because no
compensation originally offered) and English public policy.
237. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. SocietA Unione Petrolifera Orientale, 67 Il Gazzettino
(Venezia), No. 61, p. 4 (March 12, 1953) (Civil Tribunal of Venice), digested in 47
'Am. J. INf'L LAw 509 (1953). The Italian court denied an issue of public policy. In
effect it applied Act of State, for the decision said that simply to accept effects consumated
abroad was not against Italian public order.
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The lines of internal authority are unclear throughout the conduct of inter-
sovereign relations, and doubtless will remain so. Domestic techniques of judi-
cial review and statutory interpretation are not easily transferred to multi-law
situations. Judicial self-restraint is most rigorously exercised when the terri-
torial conduct-the exercise of power-in-fact--of state officials is put in issue.
In part this reflects an overall sovereign self-restraint required by the power
structure of the international community and the consequent need for mutual
tolerance; in part, the limited competency and expertise of the judiciary in
policy matters and the wisdom of using political channels and political guidance
for the resolution of political problems; in part, the protection of individual
expectations and allocation of risk, the balancing of injustice done plaintiff
abroad with the potential injustice to defendant relying on foreign process or
innocently caught in the crossfire of conflicting national policies. Only the last
encompasses a problem wholly within traditional judicial expertise.
CONCLUSION
Conflicts doctrine has always been a projection of the policies underlying
substantive rules to events that in some aspect transcend state lines. As we
adjust, adapt and change our substantive rules to effectuate values in a chang-
ing factual context, whether gradually by the judicial process or more dynami-
cally through political channels, conflicts doctrine must adjust as well. Com-
mon policies and common concepts and rules may lead to a measure of doc-
trinal uniformity at any given time, but it is a passing phenomenon. 4
We have been shifting from a jurisprudence based largely on custom and
universalized concepts of individual morality to one in which the collective
welfare-the public policy-is a conscious factor in parliamentary and judicial
legislation. The area of police power regulation has expanded at the expense
of property and contract freedoms, altering doctrine once regarded as immutable
principles of natural law. The techniques and extent of conscious social engi-
neering may vary from polity to polity, but in all the distinction between public
and private law is withering away save in the most formal procedural sense.
National courts are, therefore, faced not merely with the task of adjusting in-
dividual rights but sovereign policies and sovereign relations as well. The older
precepts about non-recognition of foreign penal, political or revenue laws, or
laws which violate the public policy of the forum reflected the attitude of a
society skeptical of all positive prescriptions. Today we are more sympathetic
to regulation in the public interest, and our tolerance of foreign prescriptions
has correspondingly expanded. Tolerance, domestically and internationally, is
expressed as constitutional standards and is not limited to the principles of local
legislation or precedent. We cannot sensibly measure the veto of conflicts
public policy by domestic standards as applied to domestic events. Nor do we.
As the world community comes into being and grows qua community it
becomes more difficult to allocate an exclusive competency to any one sovereign
to prescribe with regard to acts or events which affect with varying intensity
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values of the community as a whole. Hence the continuous effort to work
toward substantive standards in constitutional terms and in matters of more
than local interest. Often more than one state has a legitimate interest in pre-
scribing with regard to the same interstate facts, and the task of arbitrating
differences of "law," which may or may not be the formal embodiment of dif-
ferent policies, becomes more complex as it becomes intense. Refinements as
to the particular facts in terms of their impact on values is one approach to
resolution. A new and imaginative technique of bifocal statutory interpreta-
tion is needed. Perhaps we could improve the process of adjusting statutory
policies by regarding the foreign and local prescriptions as simply relevant facts
in formulating preferences for common standards-a "general jurisprudence"
for the international community as a whole, reflecting what is shared and com-
promising what is not. But here there are limits to judicial competency and a
need for new sources of political guidance. As matters stand, compromise will
often rest with territorial power to enforce where issues of policy, and politics,
are evident.
Of vital importance to both public and private international law is the avoid-
ance of projecting domestic philosophies of law to decision making in the inter-
national arena. The judicial function must involve a greater measure of dis-
cretion, a less rigid adherence to formalism and local stare decisis, particularly
as to local precedent based on different policy criteria and the compromise of
different substantive rules. We must regard the making of international law
as a vital, changing process of adjustment to new problems and ideas and facts
in which the judges play an important legislative role. We must envision the
process as a flow of decisions from which it is possible to synthesize valid prin-
ciples to be utilized in the making of future decisions.
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